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The problem of corruption in civil administration has been around for as long as 
individuals have held public office.  The Balkans has proved to be no exception.  As early 
as the 16th century, corruption began to be tolerated and widely accepted within the 
region.  The corruption problem was greatly exacerbated following the disintegration of 
communism and the successive civil wars that plagued Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s.  
During this period, governmental officials forged strong, unhealthy relationships with 
criminal elements.  These close ties between organized crime and governmental officials 
have continued unabated until the present day and help form the basis of a pervasive 
culture of corruption in the region.   
This high level of corruption in the Balkans is problematic since both the EU and 
NATO have continued to expand eastward since the breakup of the Soviet Union in the 
early 1990s.  Any new members admitted to either organization must share the same 
liberal democratic values that helped shape the original organizations and that are held 
dear by the current members.   
This thesis examines the corruption of six countries—Albania Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, and Serbia—in the Balkans and provides 
recommendations the countries should follow in their ongoing fight against corruption. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
The problem of corruption in civil administration has been around for as long as 
individuals have held public office.  The Balkans has proved to be no exception.  As early 
as the 16th century, a complex power-sharing relationship developed between local rulers 
in the Balkan countryside and their Ottoman overlords in Constantinople that helped 
cultivate corruption as a customary practice within the Balkans.  This relationship 
subsequently dominated the region for several hundred years and helped cement the 
behavior as a common staple of life in Southeast Europe.  Little had changed by the turn 
of the 20th century, as the region’s “government offices were considered sources of 
personal benefit rather than positions of civic responsibility. Corruption at all government 
levels abounded.”1  The state of affairs in the Balkans continued even with the advent of 
Marxist ideology following World War II.  The same “personalized interactions, gifts and 
favors which [had] lubricated dealings with state official[s]”2 in the past, continued to be 
a popular practice in the modern era.  Subsequently, the Balkan’s corruption problem was 
greatly exacerbated following the disintegration of communism in the region and the 
successive Civil Wars that plagued Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s.  During this period, 
governmental officials forged strong, unhealthy relationships with criminal elements 
throughout the region.  These close ties between organized crime and governmental 
officials have continued unabated until the present day and help form the basis of the 
pervasive culture of corruption that presently characterizes Southeast Europe.3  
A. IMPORTANCE 
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) have been steadily moving 
1 Dennis P. Hupchick, The Balkans from Constantinople to Communism (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), 353.  
2 Mark Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History (New York: The Modern Library, 2007) Kindle 
edition, 120. 
3 Michael Miklaucic and Moisés Naím, “The Criminal State,” in Convergence: Illicit Networks and 
National Security in the Age of Globalization, eds. Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer (Washington 
DC: National Defense University Press, 2013), 149.  
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 eastward.  The last few rounds of accession for both of these international governmental 
organizations (IGO) have included countries from the Balkans; Bulgaria, Slovenia, and 
Romania were admitted to NATO in 2004 and Croatia and Albania were welcomed in 
2009.  Slovenia was also admitted to the EU in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania were given 
admission in 2007, and Croatia gained entrance in July 2013.  The remaining 
Southeastern Europe countries that are not yet members are currently awaiting admission 
to one or both of these organizations.  Unfortunately, according to non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) such as Transparency International (TI) and the World Bank, the 
countries within this region—including those that are already members of NATO and the 
EU—are among the most corrupt in all of Europe, making the Balkans one of the most 
corrupt regions on the globe.  Before accepting new countries into these two IGOs, it is 
important for NATO and EU leaders to understand the nature of governance within the 
Southeast European states.  Withholding membership can be a powerful tool to 
encourage these countries to eradicate corruption within their borders.  For those 
countries that are already members, it is important for the international community (IC) 
to help them in their transition to mature liberal democratic values that fully respect the 
rule of law.   
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The proliferation of corruption in the Balkans has produced three primary areas of 
scholarship for study: theory articles attempting to explain how and why corruption 
originated and remains rooted in the Balkans, articles that describe actual levels of 
corruption in specific countries or regions, and compilation of news articles showing 
links between government officials and organized crime elements.  The scholarship in all 
three areas is plentiful.  However, literature that links all three areas together is 
comparatively thin; many authors who discuss levels of corruption will reference ties 
between government officials and criminal elements, but they do not normally provide 
concrete examples of cooperation.  
There are many theories on why corruption in the Balkans is so prevalent.  The one thing 
that everyone can agree on is that the corruption problem is prevalent and deeply rooted. 
 2 
 University of Sarajevo professors Darko Datzer and Aleksandar Draganic theorize that 
corruption is tied to the ethnic division that is common in the region.  Boris Divjak and 
Michal Pugh, in their article “The Political Economy of Corruption in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,” posit that the Dayton Peace Accord formed governance structures in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) that have enabled political corruption in the country.  
Divjak and Pugh also write that connections between criminal elements and political 
parties have had a detrimental effect on curtailing corruption.  Similarly, in 2010, Friends 
of Europe wrote that one impediment to corruption reform in the region is that political 
parties and candidates are often financed by criminal enterprises.  The group also cites 
the fact that anti-corruption legislation within the region is overly complex and 
burdensome.  TI Bulgaria writes that the results in the country’s anti-corruption campaign 
have been significantly below the expectations established within the government’s legal 
framework.  In Bulgaria, the judiciary is the least trusted institution in the country and 
does not do enough in prosecuting corruption; there are a distressingly inadequate 
number of prosecutions in the country’s anti-corruption campaign.4 
Authors Petros Sioussiouras and Ioannis Vavouras postulate that the functioning 
of a vibrant democracy is one of the best ways to control corruption.  Unfortunately, 
democracies within the Balkans are fairly immature and not completely developed.  
Similar to the tenets of democratic peace theory, the duration of liberal values is more 
important than the mere presence of democracy.  Corruption is likely to affect relatively 
new democracies, whereas countries with a continued presence of democratic traditions 
are better able to control it.  The authors also submit that the Balkans is made up of still 
developing, and not fully developed countries.  The authors write that 
“[c]orruption…finds fertile ground for growth in…developing countries…[and] the main 
difference between developed and developing countries is that the former are mainly 
 4 Eldan Mujanovic, Darko Datzer, and Aleksandar Draganic, Analysis of the Implementation Level of 
the BiH Anti-corruption Strategy 2009–2014  (Sarajevo: Transparency International BiH, 2011), 1;  Boris 
Divjak and Michael Pugh, “The Political Economy of Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 
International Peacekeeping 15, no. 3 (2008): 375, 384; Friends of Europe, Counter-Measures in the 
Balkans Against Organised Crime and Corruption: Report on the High-level Roundtable  (Brussels: 
Europe’s World, 2010), 4, 5; Transparency International Bulgaria, National Integrity System Assessment: 
Bulgaria Country Report 2011 (Sofia: TI Bulgaria, 2012) 4, 10–11. 
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 characterized by economic scandals while the latter are ridden with corruption.”5  
Therefore, as the Balkans becomes more developed and liberal values have time to fully 
develop, corruption will become less rooted in the region.6 
Drew Engel postulates that risk and reward are responsible for the high levels of 
corruption in the Balkans.  Organized crime is a lucrative business and legal systems in 
the region have not done enough to discourage criminals.  Additionally, most law 
enforcement and government officials are underpaid, leaving them highly susceptible to 
bribes and corruption attempts by prosperous criminal elements.  Both Engel and the 
Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) assert that administrators are too willing to 
maintain the status quo instead of passionately pursuing criminals.  The CSD goes on to 
write that law enforcement is too lenient on prominent businessmen who operate in the 
“shadow and… criminal”7 networks.  The United Nations (UN) goes even further by 
suggesting that there is “wide-spread and enduring collusion between politics, business, 
and organized crime”8 in the region.  In his article “The Rise of the Mafia State,” Moises 
Naim theorizes that in some mafia states—like Bulgaria—the interests of government 
and criminals are intimately connected.  He goes on to add that “in mafia states, it is not 
the criminals who capture the state through the bribery and extortion of officials, but it is the 
state that controls the criminal networks. It runs them for the benefit of government leaders 
and their network of accomplices and associates.”9 
Corruption in the Balkans goes beyond the theoretical. Various governmental and 
NGOs responsible for monitoring corruption in the region have produced a litany of 
reports over the past few years that document corruption levels in the Balkans.  Marie 
5 Petros Sioussiouras and Ioannis Vavouras,  “Political Rights, Development, and Corruption in the 
Balkan and Arab Mediterranean Countries.”  Mediterranean Quarterly 23, no. 1 (2012): 97, 98, doi: 
10.1215/10474552-1540720.     
6 Ibid., 90, 91. 
7 Center for the Study of Democracy, Corruption, Contraband and Organized Crime in Southeast 
Europe (Sofia: CSD, 2003), 24. 
8 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans and Affected 
Countries (Slovakia: UNODC, 2008), 7. 
9 As quoted in Moises Naim, “The Rise of the Mafia State,” The Huffington Post, May 30, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/moises-naim/mafia-state_b_1556188.html; CSD, Corruption, Contraband, 
and Organized Crime, 24. 
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 Chêne writes that corruption in all forms is present in BiH and permeates all sectors of 
government. She also reports that there are “close connections between the ruling elite 
and criminal networks,”10 which have led to corruption and organized crime becoming 
deeply rooted within BiH society.   Similarly, according to a 2011 United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report on the Western Balkans, citizens of the region 
consider corruption to be the third most important problem facing the region, after 
poverty and unemployment.  An astounding 80 percent of citizens are confronted with 
some form of corruption in a given year.  The UN also points out that the form of 
corruption in the Balkans is distinctive from the practice in other areas of the globe in that 
it is just as common in rural areas as it is in urban centers.11 
Due to the pervasive nature of corruption, public perception of the problem is also 
widespread in the region.  A 2009 Gallup study showed that more than two-thirds of the 
population in the Western Balkans believed “corruption was pervasive in business and 
government,”12 reflecting an increase since a previous report in 2006.  Similarly, a 2011 
UNODC report on BiH notes that “two thirds of the population believe that corrupt 
practices occur often or very often in a number of important public institutions, including 
central and local government, parliament, political parties…and the police.” 13  Yet 
despite the pervasiveness, the UN states that less than two percent of citizens report their 
confrontations with corruption to the authorities because over a quarter of the population 
“believe reporting to be a futile exercise”14 that would not lead to any results. 
The literature also contains numerous instances of Balkan government officials 
being suspected or arrested for their involvement with corruption and ties to organized 
10 Marie Chêne, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), (Berlin: 
Transparency International, 2009), 1. 
11 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Corruption in Croatia: Bribery as Experienced by the 
Population (Vienna: UNODC, 2011), 3; Chêne, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in BiH, 1; United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, Corruption in the Western Balkans: Bribery as Experienced by the Population 
(Vienna: UNODC, 2011), 7. 
12 Gallup Balkan Monitor, Insights and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans, (Brussels: Gallup, 2009), 
7. 
13 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bribery as 
Experienced by the Population (Vienna: UNODC, 2011), 5. 
14 UNODC, Corruption in Croatia, 4. 
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 criminal elements.  Natasha Srdoc and Joel Anand Samy wrote in 2008 that the Croatian 
prime minister (PM), Ivo Sanader, was accused of owning more than $200,000 worth of 
watches and illegally seizing private property.  Besar Likmeta followed up with a 2012 
Wall Street Journal article reporting that Sanader was finally convicted for accepting 
bribes.  Hrvoje Mataković wrote in his 2011 TI Croatia report, Transparency in Funding 
of Political Parties, how the country was racked by political party corruption affairs in 
2011.  Additionally, he discussed the arrest of the previously mentioned former PM 
Sanader and several of his officials.  Writing for the Organized Crime and Corruption 
Reporting Project (OCCRP), Stevan Dojčinović et al. describe how the personal advisor 
for the Serbian PM has numerous ties to organized crime organizations in Montenegro.  
A few months later the OCCRP released a news report stating that a former Serbian 
cabinet minister was arrested for corruption and abuse of office.15   
In Albania, Jane’s Intelligence Weekly recounted how a former senior aide to the 
Albanian deputy prime minister, Almir Rrapo, was accused of being a leading member in 
an organized crime group that—among other things—played a part in the murder of a 
New York man in 2005.  In 2009, Rrapo was facing extradition charges to the United 
States for prosecution. Linda Karadaku reported from Pristina in 2012 that the Kosovo 
anti-corruption task force chief, Nazmi Mustafi—the individual primarily responsible for 
stamping out corruption within the country—was himself arrested in 2012 on bribery and 
graft charges.16 
15 Natasha Srdoc and Joel Anand Samy,  “Corruption in Croatia”  The Wall Street Journal, May 19, 
2009,  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124267799642331663.html; Besar Likmeta, “A Specter is Haunting 
the Balkans: The Specter of Corruption,” Foreign Policy, December 6, 2012, 
http://transitions.foreignpolicy. com/ posts/2012/12/06/a_specter_is_ haunting_the_ balkans_the_  
specter_of_corruption; Hrvoje Mataković, Transparency in Funding Political Parties: Croatia 2011 
(Zagreb: Transparency International Croatia, 2011), 7, 19; Stevan Dojčinović et al., “Advisor to Serbian 
Prime Minister Worked for Montenegrin Criminal,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 
February 8, 2013, https:// reportingproject.net/occrp/index.php/en/ccwatch/28-cc-watch-indepth/1826-
advisor-to-serbian-prime-minister-worked-for-montenegrin-criminal; Organized Crime and Corruption 
Reporting Project, “Serbia: Former Minister Indicted in Corruption Case,” April 11, 2013,  
https://reportingproject.net/occrp /index.php/en/ccwatch/46-crime-corruption-updates/1924. 
16 “Albanian Police Seize Criminal Assets,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, November 3, 2010, 
https://janes.ihs.com; Linda Karadaku, “Kosovo Arrest Brings New Attention to Corruption in the 
Balkans,” Southeast European Times in Pristina, April 13, 2012, http://www.setimes. com/ 
cocoon/setimes/xhtml/ en_GB/features /setimes/features/ 2012 /04/13/feature-0.    
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 There are also numerous articles and documents outlining Bulgaria’s 
intermingling of government, corruption, and organized crime.  In his article “Criminals 
without Borders,” Moises Naim details the rise of Ilya Pavlov, who started as a petty thug 
and ended up building a multi-national crime ring.  Naim writes that Pavlov was “deeply 
entangled…with Bulgaria’s power elite.”17  Numerous politicians, military leaders, 
businessmen, and government workers attended his funeral.  Jane’s reported in 2009 that 
Alexander Filipov, the deputy prime minister for emergency relations, was arrested for a 
vote-buying scandal.  Filipov was charged with corruption, embezzlement, and 
mismanagement of both state and EU funds.   Diana Kovatcheva, writing for TI Bulgaria 
in 2011, recounted multiple instances of high-level corruption in Bulgarian government 
officials.  In the first instance, authorities were prosecuting a federal prosecutor for 
illegally accepting bribes.  In the second, the deputy ministry of the interior was 
sentenced for accepting a bribe in order to drop a claim against a prominent 
businessman.18   
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Corruption of government officials in the Balkans is a serious problem.  It not 
only impedes the maturation of liberal democratic values in the region, but also 
discourages both foreign and domestic investment.  Foreign companies are wary of doing 
business in a tumultuous and unpredictable environment where those responsible for 
monitoring corruption are regularly part of the problem.  Additionally, many foreign 
companies refuse to do business according to local practices; many foreign investors are 
turned off at the prospect of paying bribes to national and local officials in order to ensure 
the success of their endeavors.  Consequently, corruption also impedes maturation of 
these states by checking economic improvement and perpetuating environments where 
corruption can endure.19 
17 Moises Naim, “Criminals without Borders,” Slate,  April 28, 2008,  http://www.slate.com 
/articles/arts/books /2008/04/criminals_without_borders.html.    
18 Naim, “Criminals without Borders”; “Bulgarian Deputy Arrested Over Vote Buying Claims,” 
Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, July 7, 2009, https://janes.ihs.com; Diana Kovatcheva, UN Convention Against 
Corruption Civil Society Review: Bulgaria 2011, (Sofia: TI Bulgaria, 2011), 8. 
19 Divjak and Pugh, “Political Economy,” 377. 
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 According to the UNDOC, the enduring corruption in the area makes it the most 
corrupt region of Europe and one of the most corrupt in the world.  In 2006, the UNDOC 
reported that on average, 25.9 percent of Southeast Europeans had been subjected to 
corruption in the previous year compared to “only” 16.7 percent of Sub-Sahara 
Africans—a region notorious for its high levels of corruption.  Additionally, four Balkan 
countries, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, and BiH were 
ranked as less politically stable than the Sub-Sahara African average in that same year.20 
Unfortunately, measuring government involvement with corruption and crime in 
the region is very difficult.  The UNODC reports that in many cases “[c]ountries with the 
worst problems may have the lowest detection rates, and so the number of detections is 
more an indicator of good police work”21 than it is a reflection on the amount of 
corruption that is actually present.  Therefore, it is possible that even though there are 
numerous instances of prominent government representatives being arrested for their 
involvement with organized crime and corruption, these arrests better reflect the 
countries’ improvement in the fight on corruption as opposed to their further deterioration 
into corruption. 
While the above reasoning is certainly a possibility, this thesis will take the 
position that every high-profile government official arrested or suspected of corruption is 
another example of the prolific corruption problem that confronts all the nations of 
Southeast Europe.  Moreover, it is the direct involvement of the very same individuals 
who are supposed to be leading the offensive against corruption that is hindering the 
region’s efforts towards further reforms. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis examines the corruption of six countries—Albania, BiH, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Kosovo, and Serbia—in the Balkans over the past decade.  The first part of the 
thesis is a historical examination that explains why corruption initially developed a 
stranglehold on the region following the breakup of the Soviet Union.  The second part 
20 UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 91, 109. 
21 Ibid., 55–56. 
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 involves a diagnostic analysis of the corruption figures as provided by the UNODC and 
NGOs like the World Bank and TI.  The third part is a comparative case study that 
examines the specific corruption state of affairs in the six countries mentioned above.  
Last, the fourth part provides recommendations that the countries of the region should 
follow in their ongoing fight against corruption. 
While this thesis draws upon the wealth of articles outlining corruption by 
government officials in various countries within the Balkans, unfortunately, some of the 
best analysis of current events is not available in English, the thesis writer’s only 
language.  However, due to the continued proliferation of the Internet, an increasing 
amount of material is being made available in English on a daily basis.  Moreover, local 
NGOs, newspapers, and magazines continually publish articles outlining the most recent 
instances of revealed corruption.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into an introduction, four explanatory chapters, and a 
conclusion.  Chapter I introduces the basic research question and explores the methods 
used to answer it, including sections that define the current corruption problem in the 
Balkans.  Chapter II examines the underlying conditions that have enabled corruption to 
reach such a high level in the Balkans.  Additionally, organized crime and its relationship 
to corruption levels are discussed.  Chapter III provides a general overview of corruption 
within the Balkans and presents levels of corruption for each country under examination.  
Chapter IV provides six case studies for countries within the region: Albania, BiH, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, and Serbia.  In these studies, specific examples of corruption 
are detailed, including numerous examples of individuals within government who are part 
of the culture of corruption.  Chapter V provides policy recommendations that countries 
within the Balkans should follow as they maintain and intensify their efforts to eradicate 
corruption.  Chapter VI offers brief conclusions and summarizes the matter. 
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 II. ORGANIZED CRIME AS THE ROOT CAUSE OF 
CORRUPTION IN THE BALKANS BACKGROUND 
A. BACKGROUND 
Criminologists have determined that organized crime and corruption best flourish 
either in areas that are subjected to rapid social and economic changes or in regions that 
endure post-conflict transitions.  It should come as no surprise; therefore, that the Balkans 
developed into a haven for organized crime and became one of the most corrupt regions 
on the planet since many countries within Southeast Europe endured both of these 
phenomena in short order during the last decade of the 20th century.  In effect, the 
Balkans was confronted with a virtually simultaneous combination of catastrophic events, 
including: the abrupt conversion from communism to market economy, suffering caused 
by a series of brutal ethnic wars, deprivation caused by a UN enforced economic 
embargo, and the formation of numerous private security companies that developed in 
response to the demand created by disintegrating state structures and the rapid increase of 
market forces.  These significant historical events resulted in a culture where organized 
crime is deeply rooted in both business and government structures and corruption is 
pervasive.22   
1. Communism 
Although some form of organized crime was undoubtedly present in the Balkans 
prior to World War II, the real genesis of crime in the region occurred during the near 
half-century that Southeast Europe was under communist rule following World War II.  
Rationing and government controls deprived major portions of society of even the basic 
goods needed to survive on a daily basis.  For others, restrictions denied them desired 
commodities that were freely available to their neighbors in the West.  Even for those 
with positions of authority in the communist regime—such as factory managers—the 
state’s quota system often hindered their ability to meet their production goals.  The 
answer to all these problems was a thriving black market that naturally grew up out of 
22 UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 11. 
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 necessity to meet the demands generated by the lack of supply present within the 
command economy.  In order for criminals to conduct such illegal operations within an 
autocratic system, it was absolutely necessary for them to have approval and 
collaboration from representatives inside the government.  It was this official state 
complicity with organized crime, lasting for several decades that laid the initial 
foundation of the culture of corruption within the Balkans.23 
During the reign of communism, the state did not just look the other way while 
organized criminals conducted their illegal trade.  In some cases, government was the 
initiator, utilizing criminals to carry out functions for the benefit of the state.  For 
example, Josip Broz Tito regularly contracted unsavory elements to conduct covert 
actions on behalf of the Yugoslav government.  He would “recruit promising young 
career criminals, straight out of prison, to do the dirty work of spying and occasionally 
killing overseas…They specialized in extortion, robbing banks and jewelry stores, 
stealing art and trafficking in women.”24  Once communism ended, these former state-
sponsored individuals simply transitioned their services to the open market.  Organized 
criminals that had previously been successful despite the burden of a tightly run state 
flourished under the new freedoms afforded them by democracy and capitalism. 25 
Communism also contributed to the formulation of organized crime in the region 
by creating a substantial security apparatus.  Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, the 
secret police and the military regularly acted with impunity, often collaborating with the 
state-sponsored criminals mentioned above in the conduct of cross-border smuggling 
operations.  This cooperation helped develop a close relationship between the state and 
criminal elements that has persisted to the modern day.  When many of the Balkan states 
began to disintegrate in the early ’90s, some members of the military and secret police 
took advantage of their previously developed connections to organized crime and simply 
switched sides.  This provided a supply of highly trained, well-connected personnel to 
23 Moises Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy 
(New York: Doubleday, 2005), 30, 31. 
24 UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 48. 
25 CSD, Corruption, Contraband, and Organized Crime, 9. 
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 bolster the ranks of criminal elements within the region. These former state officials 
continued to maintain their connections with those who remained in security and 
government positions.26  
2. War Profiteering 
The various Yugoslav Wars that began in 1991 with the Croatian War of 
Independence helped further strengthen organized crime in the region.  Although the 
wars highlighted significant divisions, drawn along ethnic lines, between the various 
members of the former Yugoslav Republic, there were no such divisions among criminal 
elements within the region.  Instead, criminals of all ethnicities worked together in an 
effort to bolster their bottom lines through war profiteering.  On 29 November 1992, the 
UN unwittingly made war profiteering even more lucrative after it issued a series of 
embargoes that banned any country from exporting fuel, arms, and other goods needed to 
wage war in the former Yugoslavia.  Enterprising criminal elements from Bulgaria, 
Albania, and various parts of former Yugoslavia filled the economic vacuum and made 
fortunes by illegally providing the petrol, weapons, and other supplies needed by both 
sides to continue fighting.  The resulting profits from illegal trafficking “became an 
important source of income for various groups, ranging from political leaders to people, 
living in the border areas.  As a result, corruption permeated law enforcement agencies 
and political elites in these countries.”27  This strengthening of ties between criminal 
elements and the state and the subsequent corruption that it generates is one of the 
ongoing legacies of the UN embargo that has carried on until the modern day.28  
3. Private Security Companies 
Private security companies (PSC) developed in the Balkans to fill the void caused 
by the erosion of state-run socialist institutions and the political vacuum created by war.    
26 UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 8, 11. 
27 CSD, Corruption, Contraband, and Organized Crime, 9. 
28 “Efforts to Fight Organized Crime in the Balkans Pay Off,” Organized Crime and Corruption 
Reporting Project, December 5, 2011, https://reportingproject.net/occrp/index.php/en/ccwatch/cc-watch-
briefs/1257-efforts-to-fig; “The Untouchables - Organised Crime Grows Stronger in Bulgaria,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Weekly, June 16, 2011, https://janes.ihs.com; UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 
11, 12. 
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 Although PSCs were normally legal businesses that provided much needed services that 
had previously been supplied by the state, they were also often little more than legitimate 
fronts for organized crime groups in the region.  Criminal elements used their previously 
established connections with the state to recruit military and secret police personnel to 
operate these organizations.  Instead of providing their services in the public realm, 
“trained professional soldiers simply switched to private security companies, protecting 
banks, schools, money transfers and important people”29 in the private market.  In 
Bulgaria alone, the industry employed more than 100,000 former state employees, nearly 
10 percent of the adult male population.30  
Furthermore, many prominent individuals in government retained their positions 
of authority within state security while at the same time working for PSCs.  These 
individuals used “their connections, asymmetric information, and coercive power to 
dominate privatization… [which] led to an unhealthy relationship between members of 
the former secret police, criminal groups, and private industry.”31  PSCs central role in 
maintaining “ties with organized crime, corrupt politicians and law enforcement 
elements”32 played a central part in the proliferation of organized crime and corruption in 
Southeast Europe.33 
Besides providing legitimate security functions and fighting for one side or the 
other during the various wars, private security firms also regularly committed illegal 
activities such as political assassination and illicit smuggling; because of their continued 
connections with individuals in the state police, many of these crimes were overlooked or 
not punished.   The aforementioned UN embargo forced PSCs to forge even closer 
relations with organized criminals who could supply the fuel, arms, and essential goods 
29 “Private Security Firms in the Balkans Harbor Corruption, Observers Say,” Deutsche Welle, June 9, 
2010, http://www.dw.de/private-security-firms-in-the-balkans-harbor-corruption-observers-say/a-5684942-
0.  
30 Phil Cain, “Eastern Europe’s Private Armies,” Globalpost, August 21, 2010, 
http://www.globalpost.com/ dispatch/europe/100722/europe-private-security-companies; “Private Security 
Firms,” Deutsche Welle. 
31 UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 49.    
32 “Private Security Firms,” Deutsche Welle. 
33 “Private Security Firms,” Deutsche Welle; Cain, “Eastern Europe’s Private Armies.” 
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 needed for them to continue fighting the ongoing civil wars.  Even after the wars drew to 
a close, the links established between PSCs, organized criminals, law enforcement, and 
corrupt politicians during this period continued to endure.34 
B. ORGANIZED CRIME  
After suffering through nearly a decade of wars within the region, organized 
crime became firmly entrenched in the Balkans.  Many of the reasons for its success are 
purely economic: “crime not only pays but is often the most lucrative game in town, and 
its players are some of the most influential members of society.”35  In order to understand 
how bad the organized crime problem in Southeast Europe is, it is first important to 
understand what constitutes organized crime.  
Organized crime is more systematic and involves more complex operations than 
conventional crime.  The word “organized” is derived from “organization” and signifies a 
“group of people who cooperate to accomplish objectives or goals.”36  Characteristics 
between different organized criminal groups may vary considerably, but they all share a 
few commonalities, including: a hierarchy with some sort of command structure, goals 
and objectives for the organization, a specialization, and a set of rules by which members 
must act.  Most organized crime groups are primarily motivated by profit and rely on 
“violence or the threat of violence”37 to conduct their operations, which can have either a 
transnational or domestic focus.  Their activities can include a whole range of endeavors 
such as smuggling, fraud, protection, embezzlement, theft, regulation of both black and 
vice markets, and corruption.  At their basic form, most organized crime activities are 
simply a “continuation of commerce by other [not legal] means”38 by illicit actors. 39 
34 “Private Security Firms;” Deutsche Welle ; UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 49; 
Cain, “Eastern Europe’s Private Armies.” 
35 Naim, “Criminals without Borders,” 3. 
36 Stephen L. Mallory, Understanding Organized Crime (Boston: Jones and Bartlett, 2007), 2.  
37 UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 11. 
38 Patrick Radden Keefe, “The Geography of Badness: Mapping the Hubs of the Illicit Global 
Economy,” in Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, eds. 
Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2013), 98. 
39 Mallory, Understanding Organized Crime, 2; UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 11, 
45. 
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 1. Pervasiveness of Organized Crime in the Balkans 
Determining how much organized crime is present within the Balkans—or any 
country or region for that matter—is difficult because the best form of measurement is 
entirely dependent on the level of action and detection within the state.  Those countries 
that take the most actions towards uncovering and stopping organized crime within their 
borders are likely to be the countries that record the most instances of organized crime.  
Ironically, every arrest involving organized crime gives off mixed signals; it proves that 
organized crime is present and operating.  More important, however, it demonstrates that 
government is taking action to address the problem.  Conversely, those countries with the 
fewest reports of organized crime are likely to be the states with the worst organized 
crime problem; government officials simply choose to overlook the crime because they 
do not want to look impotent or because they are corrupt and personally profiting from 
the crime.  Therefore, detection rates are as much an indicator of the quality of police 
work being conducted as they are of the level of organized crime present within 
society.40  
Instead of using arrest records, an alternative way to measure the level of 
organized crime is to poll the citizens of the country.  If an extensive 2009 Gallup survey 
is to be believed, the level of organized crime in Southeast Europe is quite extensive.  
Over ten percent of the population in every country of the Western Balkans said they 
were personally affected by organized crime on a daily basis; responses were the highest 
in Kosovo and BiH at 26 and 27 percent, respectively.  When citizens were asked 
whether they were affected by organized crime occasionally, over an additional quarter 
of the population of each country answered in the affirmative; Kosovo and BiH were the 
most affected countries at an additional 41 and 39 percent, respectively.41    
Another perspective on the level of organized crime in the Balkans was provided 
in 2003 by the CSD, an independent, non-partisan, NGO based in Sofia, Bulgaria.  
According to their research, transactions conducted in the gray sector—an enormous 
40 UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 12, 56. 
41 Gallup, Insights and Perceptions, 31.   
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 market area, expertly exploited by organized crime, that falls somewhere in the middle 
ground between legal and illegal business—“comprise between 30 and 50 percent of the 
Balkan national economies”42 combined gross domestic product.  Various organized 
crime groups within the region have turned the Balkans into the planet’s major illicit 
transit zone for the traffic of guns, cigarettes, and human beings; however, the most 
prominent and lucrative good trafficked by organized crime in the region is illegal drugs, 
specifically heroin imported from Central Asia and destined for Western Europe.43   
2. Illegal Drug Trade  
Criminal networks intentionally prefer to operate in “postconflict and 
underdeveloped countries with severely weakened government infrastructures;”44 a label 
that aptly describes the countries of Southeast Europe.  Just as significant a factor in the 
development of crime in the region, however, is the Balkans geography; the region is 
located along a major trade route between Europe and Asia that has been used by traders 
and merchants for centuries.  The Balkans used to be a transit zone for silk and spices 
traveling from Asia into Western Europe.  More recently, however, the Balkan Route is 
more often used to ship amphetamines and other chemical drugs from Western Europe 
into Asia, while heroin is transported along the route from cultivation areas in 
Afghanistan and Turkey into lucrative distribution markets in the heart of Europe.  
Moreover, the region has even been used as a transit point for South American cocaine 
destined for Western Europe.45 
Of all the illicit drugs that pass through the region, heroin is the most lucrative.  
The flow of heroin along the Balkan Route is single-handedly estimated to be “worth 
more than the national economic outputs of several countries within the region, although 
it is unclear what share of this value accrues to Balkan smugglers.”46  The UNODC 
42 CSD, Corruption, Contraband, and Organized Crime, 16. 
43 Friends of Europe, Counter-Measures in the Balkans, 12; United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, Greater Stability in the Balkans is Lowering Crime (Vienna: UNODC, 2008), 2; Naim, Illicit, 2. 
44 Deville, “Illicit Supply Chain,” 64. 
45 Srdoc and Samy, “Corruption in Croatia”; Naim, Illicit, 26.  
46 UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 12, 13. 
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 estimates that more than 100 tons of heroin pass through the region in a single year.  
Ethnic Albanian organized crime groups largely monopolize the profitable heroin trade, 
controlling as much as 70 percent or more of the industry since the mid-1990s.  The 
Albanians not only control the flow of the illegal substance through the region, but also 
have extensive distribution networks set up in numerous countries within Central and 
Western Europe.  The Albanian heroin trade—which is the most notorious organized 
crime activity within Europe—is so prominent that the Council of Europe has labeled it 
as a threat to the security of the EU.  Ironically, even though copious amounts of 
narcotics flow through the region, drug use rates among Balkan citizens is quite low 
compared to European or American standards.  This efficient transmission by Albanian 
transporters means that less of the product is sold in local, less profitable markets within 
Southeast Europe, further enhancing their profit margins.47 
3. Effects of Organized Crime on Business and Government 
The established connection between politics, business, and criminals in the 
Balkans continues to be a major challenge to economic and democratic development.  
The bonds between organized crime and commerce in Southeast Europe that developed 
over the past two decades have resulted in an environment where the dividing line 
between legal and illegal business has become blurred.  Many businesses are a 
combination of the two, with legitimate operations acting as a front for illegal activities.  
In some sectors, criminal groups have tied the health of legitimate companies and 
industries to the wellbeing of illicit activities.  Fearing that they will put law-abiding 
citizens out of business and hurt the economy, even honest government officials and law 
enforcement personnel are often unlikely to navigate the complicated process of ferreting 
out the illegal actors for prosecution.  In other instances, corrupt officials are unwilling to 
take action against organized crime activities because the financial interests of both 
groups are intertwined.  This “corruption is clearly a barrier to open markets and 
prosperity”48 within the Balkans.  Another impediment to legal economic development 
47 UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 13; UNODC, Greater Stability in the Balkans, 2. 
48 Friends of Europe, Counter-Measures in the Balkans, 21. 
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 occurs when legitimate companies from other countries establish operations in Southeast 
Europe in order to take advantage of the region’s permissive environment.  Knowing 
“they cannot easily exploit institutions to their favor in their own countries,”49 they do 
their part to perpetuate the culture of corruption in the Balkans.50 
Organized crime has also hindered democratic development in the region.  
“Corruption is considered to be both a symptom of and a cause for the malfunctioning of 
democratic institutions”51 within Southeast Europe.  Judges and political parties in 
particular are especially affected by the corrupting influences of organized criminals.   
In most countries within Southeast Europe the courts have historically been 
subordinate to the executive branch—unlike in the United States where the judicial 
branch is independent.  This has resulted in many problems related to undue influence.  
Instead of justice being blind, “judges over the years have developed an acute ability to 
sense the wishes of the ruling power and to act in a way that avoids conflict and curries 
favour with such forces.”52  If the judge’s superior is a corrupt official, then the courts 
are merely an extension of the corrupt process, carrying out the desires of organized 
criminals.  This appears to be the case in many instances where courts make rulings that 
are both favorable to organized criminals while at the same time inhibiting prosecutors 
from doing their job.  “Courts dismiss on technicalities, or make findings that belittle law 
enforcement work…many courts require actual ‘criminal guilt’ before they are willing to 
freeze or order forfeiture of ill-gotten gain, which is often difficult to prove, even when a 
person is found guilty of a crime.”53  Many countries of the region also have a judicial 
appointment process that is tainted by nepotism.  Individuals become judges based on 
their connections or relations instead of their knowledge of the law.  There are also 
49 Sioussiouras and Vavouras, “Political Rights, Development, and Corruption,” 102. 
50 Sioussiouras and Vavouras, “Political Rights, Development, and Corruption,” 102; UNODC, 
Greater Stability in the Balkans, 1; UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 7. 
51 Sioussiouras and Vavouras, “Political Rights, Development, and Corruption,” 101. 
52 UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 34. 
53 Drew Engel, “A Practical Guide to Tackling Organised Crime and Corruption in the Balkans,” 
Europe’s World, Autumn 2010, http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_ 
old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/21777/language/en-US/Default.aspx.1. 
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 numerous documented cases of judges accepting favors or envelopes of cash in return for 
reduced sentences or favorable decisions.  It is not surprising then that over half the 
citizens in Southeast Europe do not trust the judiciary and believe it is routinely involved 
in corruption.54 
The judicial system, however, is not the least trusted institution in the Balkans.  
That honor, by a wide margin, belongs to political parties.  “Trust in politics is low and 
still falling”55 in Southeastern Europe.  An overwhelming majority of citizens in every 
country of the region believe that political parties are the “institutions most likely to be 
affected by corruption.”56  A recent 2011 UNODC survey reinforced this belief.  It found 
that across all the countries in the Western Balkans, “an average of 8 per cent of citizens 
were asked to vote for a certain candidate or political party in exchange for a concrete 
offer of money, goods or a favour.”57  The region’s political parties are also vulnerable to 
individuals who make political donations with the expectation of receiving favors in the 
future.  Unfortunately, the lack of adequate political oversight means that it is not 
uncommon for political parties to make decisions that are in the best interest of whoever 
can afford to write the biggest check, and not the population at large.58  
4. Is Organized Crime’s Power Waning in the Balkans? 
Although it is incontrovertible that the Balkans remains a major transit hub for the 
heroin trade, the UNODC has released a few recent reports that may indicate that 
Southeastern Europe’s organized crime groups are not as powerful as they were a decade 
ago and that the situation is improving.  A 2008 report stated that the “crime situation in 
South Eastern European countries is improving…the region is “normalizing” as it 
completes the transition to democracy and market economy and as it recovers from the 
54 OCCRP, “Corruption slows OC progress”; UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 32; 
Friends of Europe, Counter-Measures in the Balkans, 21.      
55 “Money and Politics in the Balkans,” Transparency International. March 23, 2011, 
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/money_and_politics_in_the_balkans, 1. 
56 Tinatin Ninua, Shining a Light on Political Party Financing: Albania, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR 
Macedonia and Serbia 2011 (Berlin: Transparency International, 2011), 4. 
57 UNODC, Corruption in the Western Balkans,  11. 
58 Gallup, Insights and Perceptions, 9; Ninua, Shining a Light, 4. 
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 conflicts of recent years…the Balkans do not represent a favorable environment for 
crime…the region is relatively well-developed, reducing many of the social stresses that 
can fuel crime.”59  The report goes on to say, “Most remarkably, there appears to have 
been a reduction in various forms of organized crime that emerged during the years of 
transition and conflict… Balkan organized crime is also diminishing in importance.”60  
This would suggest that the Balkans should no longer be stereotyped as a gangland where 
organized criminal groups operate above the law at will.  The UNODC argues that 
although serious problems still remain, increased stability, democracy, security reform, 
open borders, and greater integration with the rest of Europe have made organized crime 
less profitable and much riskier.  “As a result, all types of organized crime are in decline 
in the region.”61   
The UNODC bases their observations on several factors.  First, the number of 
Balkan citizens housed in Western European jails has steadily decreased over the past 
decade.  Second, there has been a significant decrease in cigarette smuggling—which had 
previously been a vital income source for organized crime groups—after international 
firms legally bought out several local producers.  Third, reports indicate that the Balkans 
have successfully attracted legal trade, which is slowly replacing illegal crime and 
smuggling.  Marin Mrcela, vice president of the Group of States Against Corruption 
(GRECO), an anti-corruption monitoring body headquartered in France, reaffirmed the 
UN’s assertion in 2010 when he stated that the “levels of organised crime…in southeast 
Europe were much lower than many claimed.  I disagree with all who think the situation 
is very bad”62 in the region.63 
Others, such as Moises Naim, would disagree with the UN’s assessment.  Instead 
of organized crime losing power, he postulates that criminal groups have simply mutated 
in response to governmental efforts to eradicate them.  “All [organized crime groups] 
59 UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 7, 8. 
60 Ibid., 16, 19. 
61 Ibid., 7. 
62 Friends of Europe, Counter-Measures in the Balkans, 29. 
63 UNODC, Greater Stability in the Balkans, 2; UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 5, 16. 
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 have moved away from fixed hierarchies and toward decentralized networks; away from 
controlling leaders and toward multiple, loosely linked, dispersed agents and cells; away 
from rigid lines of control and exchange and toward constantly shifting transactions as 
opportunities dictate.”64  Naim argues that many authorities misinterpret the changes 
these groups are making, seeing criminal networks as deteriorating because they no 
longer align with commonly held perceptions of what constitutes a traditional organized 
crime group.  Far from weakening, in general these hybrid illicit networks are actually 
much stronger than they were at the turn of the century.  Moreover, the situation is even 
more daunting because governments have not successfully changed their outdated ways 
of thinking and are still stuck with a 20th century view of what constitutes—and, more 
important, how to combat—organized crime.  Therefore, law enforcement officials 
routinely underestimate illicit network capabilities and fail to recognize just how 
pervasive their networks actually are.  In some cases, “when these networks gain 
sufficient power, they can infiltrate and corrupt governments…states do not in most cases 
have the tools necessary to protect themselves from these corrupting agents”65 that often 
have unlimited resources at their disposal.66   
C. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis is not to debate whether organized crime’s power is 
waxing or waning in the Balkans.  There is not enough documented information for this 
author to address that issue with the time and resources available.  It is evident in 
Southeast Europe, however, that organized crime’s prolonged relationship with business 
and government since the fall of communism has created an environment where 
corruption is not only tolerated but also sometimes considered the norm.  The Balkan 
“experience shows that temporary symbiosis between authorities and organized crime 
during the process of creation of new states [or during rapid and extreme social and 
 64 Naim, Illicit, 7. 
 65 Duncan Deville, “The Illicit Supply Chain,” in Convergence: Illicit Networks and National 
Security in the Age of Globalization, eds. Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer (Washington DC: 
National Defense University Press, 2013), 72. 
66 Naim, Illicit, 7. 8. 
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 economic changes as pertains to Bulgaria and Albania] leads to permanent transformation 
of state/national interests into private ones and fosters the development of corrupt, non-
transparent…societies.”67    
It would also be a mistake—principally a western one—to think that corruption 
and “illicit behavior is an aberration and [that] the people involved in this business are 
deviants…In many countries, normalcy is defined by involvement in what we are here 
calling illicit networks”68 and the inherent corruption that it produces; in fact, not 
participating is often viewed as foolish and abnormal. The rest of this thesis details the 
pervasive culture of corruption that is endemic throughout the Balkans, paying particular 
attention to instances where government officials are suspected or convicted of 
collaborating with criminal elements.69   
 
  
67 CSD, Corruption, Contraband, and Organized Crime, 9.  
68 Miklaucic and Naim, “Criminal State,” 152. 
69 Friends of Europe, Counter-Measures in the Balkans, 17. 
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 III. CORRUPTION IN THE BALKANS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The problem of corruption is not a new, modern-day phenomenon.  It has been a 
constant fixture of human society that has existed since individuals first took up positions 
of authority over their peers.  Corruption and corrupt individuals have plagued every 
culture and civilization throughout recorded history.  The contemporary trend of some 
countries and organizations making substantial efforts toward reducing corruption levels 
reflects a significant and atypical change of mindset from that of the past.  Yet even 
though some countries have made considerable strides in stamping out corruption and 
“some states [are] more or less corrupt than others, no state is above, beyond, or immune 
to public corruption.”70  Therefore, corruption is still a reality that all governments have 
to deal with; unfortunately, some governments have more of a problem than others. 
The Balkans is one region where governments still have a lot of work to do in 
decreasing the amount of corruption that is pervasive in society.  The Balkans is a large 
and diverse geographical area, slightly smaller than the state of Texas, consisting of 
eleven nation-states that are inhabited by dozens of ethnic groups.  The countries of 
Southeast Europe are all at different stages in their pursuit of curbing corruption and this 
thesis does not claim that the corruption problem in every country of the region is exactly 
the same; however, there are several parallels between the six countries—Albania, BiH, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, and Serbia—under examination here.  This chapter focuses on 
the similar corruption characteristics found throughout the Balkans; the following chapter 
highlights the individualities that are present in each country.71   
70 Miklaucic and  Naím, “The Criminal State,” 149 
71 Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Balkans,” accessed August 1, 2013, 
http://www.britannica.com/ EBchecked/topic/50325/Balkans.     
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 B. TYPES OF CORRUPTION  
Corruption, like organized crime, can be challenging to define and measure.  The 
World Bank says that corruption is “the abuse of public authority for private interest.”72  
Private interest, however, is not always synonymous with personal gain.  Sometimes 
individuals abuse public authority to materially benefit friends, relatives, or other 
organizations; political parties, for instance, are regularly the beneficiaries of corrupt 
activities.  The definition could therefore be expanded to be “the abuse of public position 
for personal or factional gain.”73    
There are two types of public corruption: grand and petty.  The term “grand” does 
not signify the amount of money involved, but instead implies the high level of office at 
which the corruption occurs.  The term grand is interchangeable with the word “political” 
to denote that this type of corruption usually involves political parties, political 
campaigns, or political leaders who abuse the inherent trust of their elected office.  
Grand, or political corruption is significant because it “leads to the misallocation of 
resources, but it also perverts the manner in which decisions are made…[because it 
occurs] where policies and rules may be unjustly influenced.”74  Unlike the grand or 
political form, “petty corruption (also called administrative or bureaucratic corruption) is 
the everyday corruption that takes place where bureaucrats meet the public directly…[it] 
is pursued by junior or mid-level agents who may be grossly underpaid and who depend 
on relatively small but illegal rents to feed and house their families.”75  By its nature, 
petty corruption normally involves smaller economic amounts than grand corruption; 
however, it is significant because it overwhelmingly affects the middle and lower classes 
of society that have low disposable income.  Petty corruption is harmful to society 
because it forces those with the least means to pay bribes to public administrators for 
basic services—like medical, educational, or police—that the state has already committed 
72 Sioussiouras and Vavouras, “Political Rights, Development, and Corruption,” 92. 
73 Divjak and Pugh, “Political Economy,” 373. 
74 U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre Glossary, U4, s.v. “political corruption,” accessed 1 August 
2013, http://www.u4.no/glossary/.  
75 Ibid, s.v. “petty corruption.” 
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 to providing.  Essentially, the bribes ensure that public officials do their job or give 
preferential treatment to the individual paying the bribe.76           
Both grand and petty corruption can be systemic or sporadic.  Corruption is 
systemic—or endemic—when it “is an integrated and essential aspect of the economic, 
social and political system…the major institutions and processes of the state are routinely 
dominated and used by corrupt individuals and groups, and…most people have no 
alternatives to dealing with corrupt officials.”77  Alternatively, sporadic corruption does 
not occur on a regular basis and is, therefore, not as harmful to a society; corrupt 
individuals simply take advantage of chance opportunities to improve their situation 
through illegal means.  Corruption can take many forms such as fraud, extortion, 
embezzlement, and nepotism; however, its most common manifestation is bribery, which 
is defined as “the act of offering someone money, services or other valuables, in order to 
persuade him or her to do something in return…Bribes are also called kickbacks, 
baksheesh, payola, hush money, sweetener, protection money, boodle, gratuity, etc.”78  
Bribery can be both systemic and sporadic and can occur at the political or bureaucratic 
level.79 
C. BRIBERY IN THE BALKANS 
Systemic petty bribery is widespread throughout Southeastern Europe despite the 
fact that every country in the region complies with the UN’s 2003 Convention against 
Corruption, which directed that the practice be made a criminal offence.  It has remained 
such a normal occurrence in the region that “over 90% of citizens there accept…that 
illicit payment[s] to people in business and government are a fact of life.”80 Not only do 
an overwhelming number of citizens tolerate the habit, but also a surprisingly high 
percentage actively takes part in the practice.  As recently as 2010, the UNODC reported 
76 U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre Glossary, s.v. “petty corruption”; CSD, Corruption, 
Contraband, and Organized Crime, 6; UNODC, Crime and its impact on the Balkans , 88.  
77 U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre Glossary, s.v. “systemic corruption.”   
78 Ibid.  
79 Sioussiouras and Vavouras, “Political Rights, Development, and Corruption,” 92; U4 Anti-
Corruption Resource Centre Glossary, s.v. “bribery.” 
80 Engel, “Practical Guide.” 
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 “one in six citizens of the western Balkans (2,475,000 [citizens], equivalent to 16.8% of 
adult population aged 18 to 64) had either direct or indirect exposure to a bribery 
experience with a public official in the 12-month period” prior to the survey.  Figure 1 
lists the percentage of citizens in each country that actually gave money, gifts, or favors 
to a public official during the same period, as well as the number of bribes they paid 
during the year.  Citizens in Bulgaria81 were the most likely to be involved, with 25 
percent of the population paying a bribe in 2011.  The citizens of BiH were a close 
second, with more than one in five citizens paying an average of six bribes during the 
year.  Alternatively, citizens of Serbia were the least likely, though individuals involved 
still paid an average of five bribes over the span of twelve months.  The percentage of 
Kosovar citizens that paid a bribe was only 12 percent, which is on the lower end, but 
remarkably these individuals paid an average of 10 bribes a year, the highest number in 
the region.  Also significant is the amount that individuals of the region pay for bribes.  If 
converted to the standard European currency, the average bribe paid in Southeastern 
Europe weighs in at 156 euros.  In many of these countries, this figure constitutes a 
substantial sum of money.  Figure 2 shows the average bribe relative to the average 
nominal monthly salary for each country. 82  Albanians paid the least at 14 percent, while 
Serbians paid the most at an astounding 35 percent; this considerable amount is higher 
than the average annual income earned by the lowest strata of the Serbian population.83  
 
81 There are no data available on the number of bribes paid by Bulgarian citizens for this period. 
82 Unfortunately there are no data available for Kosovo or Bulgaria. 
83 Karadaku, “Kosovo Arrest”; EUBusiness, “Corruption in Bulgaria”; UNODC, Corruption in the 
Western Balkans, 10, 15, 16, 21. 
 28 
                                                 
 Note: “Prevalence of bribery is calculated as the number of adult citizens (aged 18–64) who gave a public 
official some money, a gift or counter favour on at least one occasion in the 12 months prior to the survey, 
as a percentage of adult citizens who had at least one contact with a public official in the same period. The 
average number of bribes refers to average number of bribes given by all bribe-payers, i.e. those who paid 
at least one bribe in the 12 months prior to the survey.”84 
Figure 1.  Prevalence of bribery and average number of bribes paid85 
 
Figure 2.  Average bribe as a percentage of the average nominal monthly salary86  
84 UNODC, Corruption in the Western Balkans, 16. 
85 UNODC, Corruption in the Western Balkans, 16; “Corruption in Bulgaria Up to Triple the EU 
Average: Study,” EUBusiness, September 26, 2012, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/bulgaria-
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 There are some other characteristics of bribery in the Balkans that are consistent 
throughout the region.  Unlike most of the world where kickbacks and corruption are 
most common in urban environments, in Southeast Europe bribery is more likely to occur 
in the countryside than in the city.  This peculiarity is likely due to the continuing 
agrarian nature of society in the region.  Another commonality is how bribes are given.  
Although bribes can be remunerated in many forms such as favors in kind, gifts, or other 
goods, they are most often paid in local currency.  Throughout the region, more than two-
thirds of kickbacks are relatively traceless, cash transactions.  The only exception to this 
rule is by female bribe payers; Balkan women, who are almost as likely as men to offer a 
kickback to a public official, “are more likely to pay a bribe in kind—in the shape of food 
and drink”87 than to pay with cash.88 
In certain situations, citizens have little choice but to offer kickbacks to public 
officials.  The governmental apparatuses throughout the region are exceptionally 
bureaucratic and on occasion the populace is at the mercy of the administrators who run 
the system.  Officials may implicitly or explicitly state that the only way for them to do 
their job—or do their job within a reasonable time frame—is if they are paid a bribe.  In 
Albania, an astounding 52 percent of the population told Gallup “that they had to pay a 
bribe in order to solve a problem…in the year prior to the survey.”89  Bulgarians were 
almost as likely, with 48 percent of its residents feeling compelled to pay a bribe in the 
previous year.  The proportion of the population in other countries that had to pay a bribe 
to a public official was less significant.  Only 20 percent were pressured in Kosovo, 18 
percent in Serbia, 15 percent in BiH, and 8 percent in Croatia.90 
It should not be assumed, however, that Balkan residents are always forced to pay 
bribes to public officials.  In many cases, private citizens are themselves the initiators in 
order to ensure that they receive preferential treatment.  Many inhabitants of Southeast 
86 UNODC, Corruption in the Western Balkans, 21. 
87 Ibid.,10. 
       88 Ibid., 10, 16, 21. 
89 Gallup, Insights and Perceptions, 10. 
90 Gallup, Insights and Perceptions, 10; EUBusiness, “Corruption in Bulgaria.” 
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 Europe demonstrate a “lack of faith…in the ability of the public administration to 
function without payment of some kind of kickback…[The] offer of bribes is often 
considered a standard practice in the smooth functioning of the bureaucratic system.”91  
Forty-three percent of the bribes paid across the region in 2010 were instigated directly 
by a citizen as opposed to a public official.  One reason why such a high percentage of 
individuals readily offer bribes is that, more often than not, they are satisfied with the 
results of the transaction.  In a 2006 Gallup survey, more than 70 percent of citizens from 
every country in the region that acknowledged they had paid a bribe in the past twelve 
months said that the public official had adequately delivered on his promise.  It is also 
interesting to note which public officials in the region are the most likely to be the 
recipient of bribes.  The most common beneficiaries were doctors92, who were provided 
kickbacks by 57 percent of those who paid at least one bribe in the last year.  The second 
most common official was police officers, who received bribes from 35 percent of the 
citizens who paid bribes.  Also noteworthy were municipal officers and 
judges/prosecutors, who received bribes from 12 and 6 percent93 of the population, 
respectively.94 
Although bribery is rampant in Southeastern Europe, it is frequently an 
underreported and under-prosecuted activity.  Throughout the region, less than two 
percent of the population reports being solicited for a bribe to any type of legal authority.  
One obvious reason for this is that a number of law enforcement officers are themselves 
involved in the illegal activity.  As mentioned above, police are the second-most common 
public official to benefit from a kickback, and the judiciary is not far behind.  Therefore, 
some citizens may worry that they will face retaliation if they report the incident to an 
official who is also corrupt.  Additionally, many individuals are not likely to believe their 
91 UNODC, Corruption in the Western Balkans, 10, 24. 
92 Most Americans probably do not think of doctors as public officials, although they are in the state-
run medical system common throughout the Balkans.    
93 The combined percentages add up to over one hundred percent because those who give bribes often 
give to multiple officials.   
94 Zsolt Nyiri and Timothy B. Gravelle, “Corruption in the Balkans: a Real Issue for the People,” 
Gallup, November 16, 2007, http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 102757/corruption-balkans-real-issue-
people.aspx, 3; EUBusiness, “Corruption in Bulgaria”; UNODC, Corruption in the Western Balkans, 10, 
25. 
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 complaints will be taken seriously.  That sentiment is not without merit as “a formal 
procedure against the public official [that solicited a bribe] is actually initiated in only a 
quarter of reported cases.”95  Unfortunately, a Balkan citizen’s reluctance to report 
wrongdoing to the authorities does not apply only to the realm of bribery; across the 
board, “South East Europeans tend to report the crimes they experience to the police less 
often than the West Europeans do.”96  However, the most common reason that Balkan 
citizens do not report bribery to the authorities has to do with the public’s mindset on the 
issue.  Although some see it is a problem, “some citizens do not deem bribery to be of the 
same gravity as ‘real’ crimes, in part because there is a sense of acceptance that bribery is 
simply a common…and…positive practice.”97  
D. CORRUPTION IN THE BALKANS 
Some areas of the world are notorious for their high levels of corruption.  With 
large sections of the population indifferent to—or even supportive of—bribery, and 
numerous public officials acting as beneficiaries of the kickback process, it is not difficult 
to see how the Balkans has received such a reputation.  Although there are other countries 
in the world that are far more corrupt than those of Southeastern Europe, the nations of 
the region have significant room for improvement.  Organizations like TI and the World 
Bank, which make annual assessments on every nation on the globe in regards to several 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, regularly rank the region’s countries as average or 
below average in their control of corruption.  These evaluations are empirical and use 
data gathered from several think tanks, public surveys, NGOs.98  
In addition to their relation to the world average, all countries within Southeast 
Europe are ranked below the European/Central Asian average.  Figure 3 shows the World 
Bank’s 2011 “control of corruption” measurement for each of the six countries being 
95 UNODC, Corruption in the Western Balkans, 10. 
96 Ibid.  
97 As quoted in UNODC, Corruption in the Western Balkans, 10; EUBusiness, “Corruption in 
Bulgaria.” 
98 “World Bank Frequently Asked Questions Page,” World Bank, http://info.worldbank.org/ 
governance/wgi/faq.htm, accessed 1 August 2013.  
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 studied in this thesis as compared to the regional average.  The figure also provides a few 
other enlightening comparisons.  First it lists Slovenia—another former member of 
Yugoslavia—whose average is considerably higher than any of her other former sister 
nations.  In 2007, Slovenia became the first former Yugoslav country to join the EU.  
Additionally, the figure shows the averages for Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia—
generally thought to be the most corrupt areas of the world and receiving the lowest 
regional averages from the World Bank.  Albania’s 2011 score is slightly lower than the 
Sub-Saharan Africa average while Kosovo’s is only slightly higher.  Figure 4 is also 
provided to give a historical view of the region.  It shows that since 2004, little progress 
has been made by any of the six nations under examination.  In fact, only two—Albania 
and Serbia—have made any improvement at all in their control of corruption.  
Alternatively, Bulgaria, BiH, Croatia, and Kosovo have all regressed slightly and are at 




 Figure 3.  Control of corruption as measured by the World Bank in 201199 
 
Figure 4.  World Bank’s historical view of corruption in Southeast Europe.100 
99 World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators:  http://info.worldbank.org/governance 
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 1. Public Opinions on Corruption in the Balkans 
The perceptions of the citizenry throughout the region confirm the data provided 
by the World Bank.  A 2009 Gallup survey found that residents overwhelmingly thought 
corruption was widespread throughout government: 84 percent in Kosovo, 81 percent in 
BiH, 77 percent in Croatia, 73 percent in Albania, and 71 percent in Serbia expressed that 
opinion; nearly 65 percent of Bulgarians also shared this view in a similar survey taken 
by the CSD in 2009.  The problem of enduring and systematic corruption was also seen 
as one of the most important issues challenging further democratization in the Balkans.  
In Bulgaria, over 64 percent of the population believed that corruption is the country’s 
single biggest problem; Albanians also saw corruption as the top social problem.  In 
Croatia and BiH, corruption was seen as the second most important issue, while in Serbia 
and Kosovo it trailed only unemployment and poverty in its significance to the public.101  
With more than 80 percent of the population interacting with corruption at some 
point during a given year, these attitudes are fully understandable.  “Some 50 per cent of 
the population believe[s] that corrupt practices occur often or very often in a number of 
important public institutions, including central and local governments, parliament, 
hospitals, judiciary and the police.”102  Moreover, a number of citizens in Southeast 
Europe regard the problem as worse than actually reported by the World Bank.  A 2011 
UNODC survey found that more than 34 percent of citizens in the region believe that the 
level of corruption is on the rise and getting worse; another fifty percent think the level is 
stable, while a mere fourteen percent say the problem is decreasing.103 
Public opinions on the government’s ability to improve corruption levels in the 
future are similarly pessimistic.  A 2008 UNODC survey found that “54% of Bulgarians 
and 66% of Croatians do not believe that corruption will improve in the next five years.  
101 Gallup, Insights and Perceptions, 30; UNODC, Corruption in the Western Balkans, 9, 11; 
Lyubomin Todorakov, Bulgaria (Berlin: Civil Society Against Corruption, 2010), 2; UNODC, Crime and 
its Impact on the Balkans, 88. 
102 UNODC, Corruption in the Western Balkans, 11. 
103 UNODC, Corruption in the Western Balkans, 9, 11, 46; “Perception of Corruption in Western 
Balkans ‘Increasing,’ ” EurActiv, June 14, 2010, http://www.euractiv. com/enlargement/perception-
corruption-western-ba-news-495141; Todorakov, Bulgaria, 2; UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the 
Balkans, 88. 
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 Some 72% of Croatians [and] 74% of Bulgarians…think that corruption has increased 
drastically since the fall of Communism”104 in the early nineties.  Likewise, a 2011 CSD 
survey found that a substantial 65 percent of the Bulgarian population think that the 
government’s attempts at eliminating corruption have been unsuccessful, while only 29 
percent think that government action has produced any results.  Government’s inability to 
curb corruption has also helped shape the public’s view of how honest businesses in the 
region are.  An astounding 92 percent of the inhabitants in Croatia, 91 percent in Serbia, 
90 percent in BiH, and 82 percent in Kosovo consider businesses to be rife with 
corruption.  The country with the most positive view of business is Albania, where an 
amazing 67 percent of the population thinks that corruption is common.105          
2. Negative Effects of Corruption in the Balkans   
The pervasive level of corruption throughout the region has many second-order 
impacts on society in Southeast Europe.  First, it directly helps shape the negative opinion 
of government held by a large number of citizens.  A majority of residents in several 
nations of the region are not satisfied with their country’s institutions and have a negative 
perspective on governmental performance.  In Croatia, nearly two-thirds of the 
population thinks governmental performance is “poor” while not even 1 percent see it as 
“excellent” and only 12 percent see it as “good”.  Similarly, in BiH 60 percent of the 
population thinks governmental performance is poor, while only a combined 10 percent 
thinks it is good or excellent.  Likewise in Serbia, 44 percent have a poor view of 
government, while only a combined 17 percent view it as good or excellent.  Perspectives 
are better elsewhere; however, 46 percent in Kosovo and 56 percent of the population in 
Albania think governmental performance is either poor or “only fair”.106 
Second, the persistent high levels of corruption decrease the likelihood that a 
country will be admitted into the EU.  According to the World Bank, the 
European/Central Asian region’s control of corruption average is second only to that of 
104 UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 88. 
105 Center for the Study of Democracy, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Bulgaria (2011–2012), 
(Sofia: CSD, 2012), 8; Gallup, Insights and Perceptions, 31. 
106 Gallup, Insights and Perceptions, 25. 
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 North America; moreover, most countries currently within the EU have control of 
corruption averages that are significantly higher than the regional average, which is 
decreased significantly by the relatively low scores of many Central Asian countries.  The 
EU has considerable reservations about allowing countries that do not share the group’s 
same high ethical standards to join the federation.  According to the EU’s 2012 
enlargement report, “organized crime and corruption are the biggest obstacles facing 
Western Balkan countries that seek EU membership.”107  Although Bulgaria was 
previously granted accession in 2007, it has since been subjected to severe EU scrutiny 
for its lingering corruption problems.  The Union is unlikely to make the same mistake in 
the future and instead will require countries to clean up their corruption problems prior to 
being allowed to join.  Croatia, for instance, was recently granted admission to the EU on 
1 July 2013.  The World Bank had routinely ranked Croatia as the country with the most 
control of corruption in the region.  Even so, to ensure that additional steps were taken to 
further improve the country’s corruption situation, the EU worked closely with Croatia 
and monitored its progress for several years prior to granting it accession.108 
Third, corruption continues to inhibit the social, economic, and democratic 
development of the region.  It is a major “barrier to the implementation of necessary 
development, political, economic, and social changes.”109  As previously mentioned, 
corruption is one of the general public’s major concerns.  It is also one of the primary 
reasons that governments in the region continue to malfunction and why citizens have no 
faith in their leaders.  Moreover, it discourages foreign investors and drives away 
potential financiers who are unwilling to operate under the region’s current conditions.  
Therefore, it limits economic development and prevents Southeast Europeans from 
achieving the same higher standard of living that is enjoyed by citizens in Western 
Europe.  Additionally, corruption has a self-perpetuating effect.  “Corrupt practices, 
107 “Organized Crime, Corruption Frustrate Balkan EU Hopes,” Organized Crime and Corruption 
Reporting Project, October 10, 2012, https://reportingproject.net/occrp/index. php/en/ccwatch/cc-watch-
briefs/1665-organized-cr.  
108 OOCRP, “Organized Crime”; UNODC, Corruption in the Western Balkans, 7; Oliver Joy and 
Deanna Hackney, “Make that 28: Croatia Becomes Newest EU Member,” CNN, July 1, 2013, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/ 07/01/world/europe/croatia-eu-membership.  
109 Sioussiouras and Vavouras, “Political Rights, Development, and Corruption,” 90. 
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 including bribery, foster perceptions about corruption and those perceptions, in turn, 
foster corruption”110 in an ongoing vicious cycle of corruption.111 
E. CONCLUSION 
The age-old practice of corruption can take many different forms.  It can be both 
grand, involving high level politicians, or petty, when conducted by mid to low level 
bureaucrats.  The two differ in scope, but both forms are harmful to any society in which 
they occur.  Corruption can also be either a sporadic event, or even worse, it can be a 
systemic and endemic practice.  Petty corruption by public officials, most commonly 
manifested as bribery, is a systemic problem that has had many detrimental effects on 
society in the Balkans.  It is such an everyday occurrence that it is accepted as a fact of 
life by 90 percent of the region’s citizens.  Moreover, roughly 16 percent of the citizenry 
is either directly or indirectly involved with bribery in any given year.  In some cases 
individuals are pressured to pay significant sums of money to ensure that administrative 
officials provide services already promised by the state.  In other instances, residents 
proactively offer kickbacks to public officials in order to ensure the smooth functioning 
of the bureaucratic system or to obtain preferential treatment.  Regardless of what party 
initiates the kickback process, bribery is consistently an underreported and under-
prosecuted crime in Southeastern Europe.  It is not considered a “real” crime and many of 
the same public officials responsible for clamping down on the wrongdoing—such as 
police officers, judges, and prosecutors— are themselves involved in the misconduct.    
In their annul evaluations, the World Bank routinely ranks the six Southeast 
European countries being examined in this thesis as average or slightly below average in 
their control of corruption.  Every country has been ranked below the European average 
for over a decade, and all are positioned considerably behind most other European states, 
including the former Yugoslav nation of Slovenia, which was previously admitted to the 
EU in 2007.  Appallingly, Kosovo and Albania are routinely given rankings 
commensurate with the averages of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the two most 
110 UNODC, Corruption in the Western Balkans, 43. 
111 UNODC, Corruption in the Western Balkans, 5, 7; Divjak and Pugh, “Political Economy,” 377; 
Sioussiouras and Vavouras, “Political Rights, Development, and Corruption,” 89. 
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 corrupt regions in the world.  Furthermore, there has been little improvement in the 
region for the better part of a decade.  Since 2004 there have been only marginal 
improvements in Serbia and Albania, while the other four countries have actually 
regressed in their relative rankings as compared to the rest of the world. 
The negative results published by the World Bank are echoed by the results of 
numerous public opinion polls that overwhelmingly show that citizens of the region have 
unfavorable views of their governments.  Many believe that their government’s efforts 
have done little to control the corruption problem in the past and they are doubtful that 
attempts will be successful in the future.  Besides restraining social progress, corruption 
in Southeast Europe is also one of the main factors inhibiting economic and democratic 
development; widespread corruption and ties to organized crime are the main barriers 
preventing several of the countries from being admitted to the EU.  Additionally, the 
region’s dishonest environment discourages foreign investment that could help narrow 
the economic gap between the Balkans and the rest of Europe. 
  
 39 
 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 40 
 IV. CASE ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION AMONG THE 
COUNTRIES OF THE BALKANS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a more in-depth look at the corruption problems facing each 
of the six Balkan countries being examined in this thesis.  There are many unique 
characteristics that are discussed for each country, but an unhealthy relationship between 
members of the political elite and elements of organized crime is the one element that is 
consistently present in every country examined.  To better appreciate the nature of these 
associations, it is important for the reader to properly understand what constitutes an 
organized criminal.  Although some individuals are abominable characters that closely 
resemble the violent mob bosses popularly depicted in Hollywood movies, the greater 
majority are individuals that collectively and systematically use illegitimate practices to 
exploit legal markets.  Instead of focusing entirely on illegal trades, most organized 
criminals these days are businessmen—and are regularly described as such in the 
following pages—that use or take advantage of bribery, extortion, cronyism, graft, and 
embezzlement for financial gain.112 
The information in this chapter is taken directly from newspaper articles and press 
announcements released by several monitoring groups within the region.  It is important 
to note that unless it is explicitly stated that a person has been found guilty, all 
individuals accused of wrongdoing are innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.  It is 
highly likely that not every politician accused of corruption in the following pages is 
actually guilty; it is similarly likely that not every person found not guilty—or released 
on a technicality—is actually innocent.  It became abundantly clear while conducting this 
research that while corruption in Southeastern Europe is pervasive and many of the 
allegations of impropriety are based in reality, accusations and false charges are also a 
common and powerful political weapon within the region; this tactic is frequently used 
by a party that has just come in to power to besmirch the party that has recently lost 
112 Naim, Illicit, 261. 
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 power.  Regrettably, establishing the validity of claims and making determinations about 
guilt and innocence go far beyond the scope of this project.  Those decisions are best left 
to a court of law—though once again this is problematic since many of the judicial 
systems in the region are also subject to corruption and outside influence.   
Overall, this project attempts to paint a picture of the corruption situation in the 
region by consolidating as many recent real world examples as practical.  The reader 
should not assume that the quantity of articles or number of examples—or lack thereof—
about a specific country is positively correlated with how bad that nation’s corruption 
problem actually is.  Instead, just the opposite is true; the two longest sections are about 
Bulgaria and Croatia, both of which have regularly received the region’s best control of 
corruption rankings from the World Bank for the past decade.  The large amount of 
information available on these countries is a result of the increased oversight surrounding 
each nation’s accession to the EU.  The number of available articles is also a direct 
reflection of which countries are taking the most steps to stamp out corruption.  Those 
countries that lack the political will to make arrests have far fewer news articles 
documenting their efforts.  Lastly, this chapter utilizes only news articles and monitoring 
reports written in English.  There were countless other articles available —for all six 
countries—that were written in various Southeast European languages; unfortunately, due 
to time and funding constraints there was no way to get them translated into English. 
B. ALBANIA 
1. Introduction 
Albania started the millennium as one of the most corrupt countries in the 
Balkans, as ranked by the World Bank.  Despite incremental improvement over the past 
eleven years, they have still consistently been ranked at the bottom of the region in every 
year for which data is available.  The country also houses some of the most powerful 
organized crime networks in all of Europe.  It is no surprise, therefore, that criminals 
have infiltrated the country’s political system and tainted many high-level politicians.  
While some Albanian politicians go so far as to conduct criminal activities themselves, 
others enable, protect, and profit from illegal endeavors.  Unfortunately, Albania’s 
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 problem is further exacerbated by a judicial system that is subject to political interference 
and too often lenient on prominent individuals’ accused of corruption.   
2. Albanian Organized Crime and Politics 
Organized Crime and Albania are almost synonymous.  If a movie director wants 
to portray criminals in Europe, Albanians are likely to show up.  One famous example is 
portrayed in the movie Taken, starring Liam Neeson, where ethnic Albanian criminals 
operate a network of kidnapping and teenage prostitution across Europe.  While the film 
emerged from a Hollywood script, the storyline is a legitimate reality.  According to 
Europol, “Albanian Organized Crime groups constitute one of the most expanding and 
networked criminal groups in Europe.”113  Albanian crime groups not only control many 
illegal trades throughout the region but also have infiltrated the country’s highest levels 
of government, fostering corruption among Tirana’s political elite.  Oddly, most 
Albanians don’t make the connection between organized crime and government; while 
nine out of ten residents think the government is corrupt, the population as a whole feels 
less affected by organized crime than any other group in the Balkans.114     
Nevertheless, the links between criminals and politicians in Albania are 
numerous.  In 2010, Almir Rrapo—secretary of foreign ministry and former senior aide 
to the Albanian deputy prime minister—was extradited to the United States to stand trial 
for his involvement in an international crime ring that was accused of committing 
murder, racketeering, and trafficking.  Prosecutors in New York alleged that Rrapo was a 
high-ranking member of the Krasniqi Gang, accusing him of killing a man in Queens in 
2005 as well as kidnapping and aggravated assault.  Authorities eventually sentenced 
Rrapo to six years in a United States prison.115 
In most instances, Albanian politicians do not moonlight as senior members of 
organized crime gangs.  Instead, the associations and relationships maintained between 
     113 “Europol Targets Albanian Organized Crime,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting 
Project, April 12, 2013, https://reportingproject.net/occrp/index.php/en/ccwatch/cc-watch-briefs/1928-
europol-targ.  
114 Gallup, Insights and Perceptions, 12, 14; UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 16. 
115 “Albania Police Seize Criminal Assets,” Jane’s. 
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 criminals and the country’s political elite regularly corrupt the latter.  In 2011, high-
ranking members of the ministry of economy were arrested for “receiving bribes in return 
for issuing fake declarations regarding the quality and measurement of fuels.  They face 
charges for passive corruption, exercising unfair influence, embezzlement and abuse of 
power.”116  In recent years numerous other top-level officials in the Albanian government 
have been arrested for corruption, including the deputy minister for public works and 
transportation, the secretary general of the ministry of labor and social affairs, and the 
director general of the roads.  In another important case, the minister of economy, Dritan 
Prifti, and his deputy, Leonard Beqiri, were also indicted for corruption.  Both were 
arrested after authorities discovered a video showing the two of them in the process of 
splitting a €69,000 bribe.  The video was inadvertently found on Prifti’s computer during 
a separate investigation into Deputy Prime Minister Ilir Meta being conducted by the 
authorities.117 
Meta, who had previously served as Albania’s prime minister from 1999 to 2002, 
was serving as deputy prime minister at the time of his arrest in 2011.  Meta was accused 
of abuse of office and attempting “to benefit from the contracting process for a planned 
hydroelectric power station”118 by accepting bribes.  The main evidence against him was 
a video that clearly showed Meta manipulating the contracting process and discussing a 
significant €700,000 bribe with former Economy Minister Dritan Prifti, who was 
mentioned above.  Despite the video being authenticated by a U.S. technology expert, the 




116 “Nine Officials of Albania's Ministry of Economy Arrested on Corruption Charges,” Albanian 
Anti-Corruption Portal, November 18, 2011, http://www.anticorruption-albania.org/home/news-from-
albania/110-nine-officials-of-albania-s-ministry-of-economy-arrested-on-corruption-charges.  
117 Albanian Anti-Corruption Portal, “Nine Officials”; UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 
90; “Former Minister and Deputy Indicted,” Albanian Anti-Corruption Portal, March 12, 2012, 
http://www.anticorruption-albania.org/home/news-from-albania/138-former-minister-and-deputy-indicted-
for-corruption.   
118 Vilma Filaj-Ballvora, “Acquittal Highlights Albania’s ‘Culture of Impunity,’ ” Deutsche Welle, 
January 1, 2012, http://www.dw.de/acquittal-highlights-albanias-culture-of-impunity/a-15680992.  
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 evidence.  This “disappointing, if not unexpected, verdict…highlights the fact that the 
neutrality of the country’s judiciary deserves to be questioned”119 and is often in grave 
doubt.120    
3. Corrupt Judicial System 
Few would deny that the Albanian judiciary system is corrupt and subject to 
political interference—even Albanian judges generally have an unfavorable view of the 
system.  In a 2012 survey conducted by the Center for Transparency and Freedom of 
Information (CTFI), more than 58 percent of the country’s magistrates candidly assessed 
the state of legal affairs within the country.  In the study, one if four admitted to regularly 
paying bribes themselves, even if only at public hospitals in exchange for preferential 
medical care; another one in five confessed to paying bribes on occasion.  Tellingly, only 
a mere “18 per cent of respondents said the justice system was not corrupt, 58 per cent 
described corruption as a perception and 25 per cent believed it was corrupt.”121  
Additionally, only one in three said they thought the system was “free from political 
interference.”122  Alternatively, half said it was only partly free and seven percent said 
definitively that it was not free.  The individuals most commonly cited by the judges as 
interfering in court cases “included government officials, local politicians, lawyers, MPs 
[Members of Parliament] and the President’s office.”123  Additionally, 10 percent of the 
judges refused to answer any of the questions for various reasons.124 
The political interference and corruption of the Albanian judiciary has had 
appalling consequences over the past several years.  Although there have been a handful 
119 Ibid. 
120 Filaj-Ballvora, “Acquittal Highlights”; Besar Likmeta, “Albania Hit by Video Corruption 
Scandal,” Balkan Insight, January 12, 2011, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-hit-by-video-
corruption-scandal; Likmeta, “A Specter is Haunting the Balkans,” 2; Albanian Anti-Corruption Portal, 
“Former Minister and Deputy Indicted.” 







                                                 
 of corruption cases against prominent members of the country’s political elite—the most 
well-known being the aforementioned case against Deputy Prime Minister Ilir Meta—
none have resulted in a conviction.  “The legal proceedings against them have either 
stopped because of lack of evidence, or been postponed.”125  This has recently drawn a 
considerable amount of public outrage by citizens and the media alike, who have 
increasingly accused judges of “using dubious procedural grounds”126 to excuse crooked 
politicians.127 
Unfortunately, Albanian law hampers the prosecution of corrupt judges because it 
grants most members of the judiciary immunity from prosecution.  Even in cases where 
prosecutors have been able to collect substantial evidence and have conducted trials 
against corrupt magistrates, they are normally found not guilty.  According to Ina 
Rama—Albania’s general prosecutor—“There is a sort of corporatism between judges to 
protect each other…They don’t view the case as an indictment against a judge...but rather 
as an indictment against a friend or colleague.”128  Rama has unsuccessfully implored 
parliament several times in the past to strengthen the government’s ability to fight 
corruption by passing a constitutional amendment that would rescind the current 
immunity of judges.129 
C. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
1. Introduction 
After nearly four years of religious conflict and civil war, BiH was separated into 
two autonomous regions by the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords: the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, whose borders were drawn around ethnic and 
religious divides.  This tenuously brokered agreement joined these two regions together 
125 Filaj-Ballvora, “Acquittal Highlights.” 
126 “Albania Courts Lenient Towards Corrupt Judges,” Albanian Anti-Corruption Portal, April 7, 
2012.  http://www.anticorruption-albania.org/home/news-from-albania/141-albania-courts-lenient-towards-
corrupt-judges.  
127 Likmeta, “A Specter is Haunting the Balkans.” 
128 Albanian Anti-Corruption Portal, “Albania Courts Lenient.” 
129 Ibid. 
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 under a weak, decentralized central government.  Many of the governance problems that 
exist in the country today can be traced back to 1995 when “the complex administrative 
mechanics prescribed by Dayton presented opportunities for the abuse of public office, 
limited attempts to establish a social contract between individual and state, and made it 
difficult to eliminate corruption.”130  Although BiH started the millennium with one of 
the better World Bank averages in the region, stagnated improvements over the past 
decade have left BiH trailing all the other Southeast European countries except for 
Kosovo and Albania.  The country is dominated by corrupt political parties, which are 
“regarded as the most corrupt sector in BiH by far.”131  There is also deeply rooted 
organized crime that has forged serious connections with the country’s political elite.  
Moreover, the country’s judicial system is either incapable or unwilling to tackle the 
pervasive corruption problem through legal means.132    
2. Corrupt Political Parties 
The general public in BiH views political parties as the most corrupt organizations 
in the country, “introducing fraud, theft, cronyism and other corrupt behavior into 
executive and legislative institutions, as well as indirectly undermining the law 
enforcement institutions of the judiciary, prosecution services and police.”133  In public 
opinion polls, citizens, on average, give political parties a 4.4 on a 5-point corruption 
scale, with 1 being not corrupt at all and 5 being extremely corrupt.  Any ambitious 
individual hoping to advance economically or socially in BiH society “within his or her 
ethnic group has to have support from one or more of the [country’s] political 
parties…the new political elite that has emerged in the post-war context entertains close 
ties with both criminal and informal networks as well as nationalistic political parties.”134  
By nature, political parties depend on donations for their success, and unfortunately 
130 Divjak and Pugh, “Political Economy,” 374. 
131 Divjak and Pugh, “Political Economy,” 375. 
132 “Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina President Arrested in Graft Probe,” Regional Anti-
Corruption Initiative, April 26, 2013, http://www.rai-see.org/news/south-eastern-europe/3699-federation-
of-bosnia-and-herzegovina-president-arrested-in-graft-probe.html.    
133 Divjak and Pugh, “Political Economy,” 376. 
134 Chêne, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in BiH, 3. 
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 BiH’s organized criminals normally have the deepest pockets.  This has reinforced the 
strong link between government and criminals that grew up during the Bosnian War 
nearly two decades ago.135 
3. Government Links with Organized Crime 
Organized Crime in BiH is rooted in the volatility caused by rapid conversion 
from communism to capitalism and exacerbated by nearly a decade of warfare in the 
region.  The wars and the embargoes that were levied “encouraged the organization of 
smuggling channels for arms necessary for fighting the war by groups closely connected 
to the highest political spheres.  Subsequently activities were extended to other criminal 
activities such as drug or women trafficking throughout the region with the knowledge 
and often active participation of the ruling elite.”136  Therefore, as far back as the 
formation of the current state, political leaders have had connections to individuals that 
presented a clear conflict of interest to good governance.  Historically, BiH’s political 
leaders have not been punished for these connections.  For instance, around the turn of 
the century, Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik was accused of 
embezzlement and corruption on several occasions but was never charged.  It was not 
uncommon for his administration to issue “highly non-transparent public 
contracts…involving hundreds of millions of euros-worth of undisclosed deals”137 that 
attracted little to no attention from the country’s law enforcement agencies.138 
Additionally, in 1999 an anti-fraud unit discovered that around a billion dollars of 
international reconstruction aid money was unaccounted for.  This included millions of 
dollars missing from the Bank of BiH, which ultimately collapsed.  Many members of the 
country’s political elite were implicated, including Bakir Izetbegovice—son of the then 
president of the Federation of BiH.  In the end, Bakir was never prosecuted.  In 2010, 
135 Ibid., 3, 4. 
136 Ibid., 4. 
137 Divjak and Pugh, “Political Economy,” 378. 
138 Divjak and Pugh, “Political Economy,” 378; Chêne, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in BiH, 4. 
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 Bakir—seemingly unscathed by the previous scandal—followed in his father’s footsteps 
and was elected to be the president of the Federation of BiH.139 
In recent years, little has changed from the turn of the century.  The “apparatus of 
orderly government is too often hijacked by political elites who siphon off proceeds from 
the national treasury and transform government bureaucracies into bribe-collection 
agencies that impede business.”140  For example, in 2011, the mayor of Brcko, Dragan 
Pajic, and six other senior government officials were arrested for bribery and abuse of 
office.  Authorities alleged that Pajic “was at the top of a pyramid of certain illegal 
businesses and activities,”141 including the traffic of drugs and other illicit goods.  
Unfortunately in most cases, transparency and accountability are often lacking.  The best 
example of this is the arrest of Zivko Budimir—president of the Federation of BiH—in 
April of 2013 by anti-corruption police.  Budimir “was suspected of taking bribes in 
exchange for granting amnesty to a number of convicts.  The police said that one 
suspected drug trafficker, who was arrested in Friday’s scoop [along with Budimir and 18 
others], had [previously] been pardoned by Budimir.”142  Two months later, however, the 
country’s Constitutional Court controversially ruled that Budimir and all those arrested 
with him in the earlier round up, including the drug traffickers, were to be freed from 
prison.143 
4. Lack of Oversight 
The previous example illustrates that in BiH the judicial system too often lacks 
the political will required to properly prosecute corrupt politicians and organized 
139 Divjak and Pugh, “Political Economy,” 375. 
140 Ibid., 376. 
141 “Bosnian District Mayor, Senior Officials Arrested for Abuse of Office,” Regional Anti-
Corruption Initiative, October 4, 2011, http://www.rai-see.org/news/south-eastern-europe/3245-bosnian-
district-mayor-senior-officials-arrested-for-abuse-of-office.html.    
142 Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative ,“Federation of BiH President Arrested.” 
143 Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, “Federation of BiH President Arrested”; Chêne, Corruption 
and Anti-Corruption in BiH, 1; Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, “Bosnian District Mayor”; “President 
of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Charged with Graft, Freed from Jail,” Regional Anti-Corruption 
Initiative, May 25, 2013, http://www.rai-see.org/news/south-eastern-europe/3764-president-of-federation-
of-bosnia-and-herzegovina-charged-with-graft-freed-from-jail.html.  
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 criminals.  Many instances of corruption highlighted by the media, watchdog groups, or 
civil society against the country’s political elite never even make it to a courtroom; the 
wrongdoing is simply swept under the rug and the perpetrators are not held accountable.  
When an indictment is made against a high-level official, the courts routinely dismiss the 
charges “on petty technicalities.”144  To make matters worse, the country lacks an 
adequate legal infrastructure to handle the number of active cases, meaning that trials can 
languish in the system for years; as recently as 2012 BiH had “more than 2 million 
backlogged court cases—one for every two citizens”145 within the country.  All of this 
has left the Bosnian population with a very negative view of the country’s judicial 
system; citizens do not trust the judiciary and think that judges are nearly as corrupt as 
the nation’s political parties.  In a 2012 survey, half of the country’s residents said they 
thought that the most corrupt individuals within the country were the very people “that 
should be fighting the trend,”146 individuals like judges and prosecutors.147  
In addition, many of the country’s regulations and legislation are written in a way 
that helps enable corruption.  For instance, Members of Parliament (MP) are immune 
from prosecution in corruption cases unless their immunity is first revoked by the 
parliamentary assembly.  Additionally, “civil servants who are convicted of corruption 
are not prohibited from future government employment.”148  After simply serving a short 
sentence for their wrongdoing, individuals may legally return to public office if they can 
get elected or appointed.  Lastly, the country does not have adequate whistle-blower laws.  
Therefore, individuals who are aware of illegal behavior are less likely to report an 
144 Sonia Zujo, “Balkan Countries Fail in Anti-Corruption Efforts,” Organized Crime and Corruption 
Reporting Project, March 30, 2012, https://reportingproject.net/occrp /index.php/en/ccwatch/cc-watch-
indepth/1467-balkan-countries-fail-in-anti-corruption-efforts. 
145 Ibid. 
146 “Corruption Problems Plague Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, 
August 9, 2012, http://www.rai-see.org/news/south-eastern-europe/3079-corruption-problems-plague-
bosnia-and-herzegovina.html. 
147 Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, “Corruption Problems Plague Bosnia and Herzegovina”; 
Divjak and Pugh, “Political Economy,” 376, 378; Chêne, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in BiH, 4; Zujo, 
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148 Chêne, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in BiH, 6. 
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 offense because they are likely to suffer retribution from those implicated, especially if 
the offenders are well connected.149 
Another factor holding back corruption reform in BiH is that the government has 
not always allowed anti-corruption civil society organizations (CSO) to properly carry 
out their responsibilities.  After TI Bosnia-Herzegovina pointed out numerous corruption 
issues to the BiH state administration, the organization “suffered repeated political attack 
from government…and was forced to suspend its activities in July 2008 for a few weeks.  
The government…announced that they would bring charges against Ti-BiH for 
expressing its opinions and views.”150   
D. BULGARIA 
1. Introduction 
Corruption has been a primary social and political concern in Bulgaria since the 
end of the 1990s.  In 2004, Bulgaria was admitted to NATO and began stepping up 
accession talks with the EU.  Since that time, corruption has been the number one issue 
on the government’s agenda.  Although Bulgaria’s World Bank control of corruption 
ranking is relatively high when compared to the other countries within Southeast Europe, 
it has consistently been ranked dead last in the EU since being welcomed to the European 
community—alongside Romania—in 2007.  Although meaningful steps have been made 
to improve the country’s control of corruption, Sofia still has considerable work to do in 
order to bring the country up to accepted European levels.  Regrettably, law enforcement 
and the judiciary are two of the least trusted institutions in the country.  There is also a 
significant disparity between the number of individuals arrested for high-level corruption 
and those ultimately convicted.  Most important, there is a substantial documented history 
of political elite involvement with organized crime within the country.151  
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid., 8. 
151 TI Bulgaria, National Integrity System Assessment, 4, 10; In fact, there are more documented 
examples for Bulgaria than any other Balkan country.  One reason for this is most likely due to the fact that 
Bulgaria has received increased scrutiny after its admission to the EU in 2007.   
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 2. Distrust of Law Enforcement and the Judiciary 
Bulgarian citizens are justifiably pessimistic about the state institutions that are 
supposed to be responsible for cracking down on corruption and organized crime in the 
country.  Decades of collusion between government and criminal organizations have 
created a situation in which the lines that are intended to differentiate between good and 
bad, legal and illegal, have become blurred for most citizens.  As such, “Bulgarians 
mistrust the judiciary and the police more than any other EU country, with the exception 
of Latvia.”152  Several surveys have shown that Bulgarians think that law enforcement is 
the country’s most corrupted institution.  The former head of the Bulgarian anti-
organized crime police, Vanyo Tanov, reinforced this notion by stating that criminals 
regularly “recruit[] police officers to obtain information about possible operations against 
them.”153  It is not surprising, therefore, that within the EU, Bulgarian citizens are the 
least likely to report knowledge of, or being victim to, a crime.154   
Even when individuals are arrested for crimes or corruption, the federal court 
system’s conviction rate is woefully low.  In 2011, TI Bulgaria stated that the country’s 
“main weakness remains the anti-corruption output, which is judged by commentators to 
be low.”155  Others have been critical of both the judiciary’s lack of convictions and the 
high number of acquittals in cases involving grand corruption or organized crime.  One 
critical voice has come from the EU, which believes that Bulgaria relaxed its efforts 
towards reform after being admitted to the union in 2007.  In July 2008, the EU froze 
over 800 million euros of funding to Sofia because of renewed fears over corruption and 
organized crime.  The EU reprimanded the Bulgarian system “for failing to prosecute 
organized crime leaders, in particular those with strong political connections…and 
making little to no progress in fighting corruption.”156  In response to the castigations, 
Sofia released an 80–point plan to address the criticisms leveled by the EU.  
152 “OC grows stronger in Bulgaria” Jane’s. 
153 Ibid.    
154 “OC grows stronger in Bulgaria,” Jane’s; TI Bulgaria, National Integrity System Assessment, 10. 
155 TI Bulgaria, National Integrity System Assessment, 11. 
156 “EU Keeps Watch on Bulgaria and Romania,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, July 17, 2009, 
https://janes.ihs.com.  
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 Unfortunately, it is not Bulgaria’s legal framework that is in doubt, it is the political will 
to follow through and actually battle corruption that is in question.157    
Optimism was high after Boyko Borisov was elected prime minister following the 
country’s June 2009 elections.  As the mayor of Sofia he had been known for his tough 
stance on organized crime and his “promise to tackle crime and corruption was one of the 
primary reasons”158 his party was voted into power.  Unfortunately, after being elected, 
his party’s “record in fighting organized crime and the entrenched interests around it 
[was] mixed”159 as many high-level cases were either dropped, sought reduced sentences, 
or did not result in prosecution due to lack of evidence.  One prominent example is a 
2011 corruption case surrounding the former minister of defense, who was accused of 
offering a bribe to an investigator, hoping the detective would falsify evidence in an 
ongoing investigation into the minister’s conduct.  Disappointingly, the corruption 
charges were dropped due to a lack of evidence, despite the fact that the state still 
pursued the lesser offense of offering a bribe.160 
Many citizens in Bulgaria believe that the reason the courts have trouble 
prosecuting the political elite is because the judges are themselves involved in the 
corruption process.  No case exemplifies this more than controversial magistrate Veneta 
Markovska, who in October 2012 was elected by parliament to the Bulgarian 
Constitutional Court—the country’s most eminent judicial body, analogous to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  Her selection received immense scrutiny from the European 
Commission “after information was leaked that she had attempted to use her influence to 
pressure the Ministry of Interior to suppress an investigation.”161  Ultimately, the 
157 “EU Keeps Watch on Bulgaria and Romania,” Jane’s; “Alleged Bulgarian Crime Leader Given 
Jail Sentence,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, January 24, 2012, https://janes.ihs.com; “OC grows stronger in 
Bulgaria,” Jane’s; “Bulgaria Replaces Funding Suspended by EU Over Corruption,” Jane’s Intelligence 
Weekly, August 11, 2008, https://janes.ihs.com; TI Bulgaria, National Integrity System Assessment, 4. 
158 “OC grows stronger in Bulgaria,” Jane’s.   
159 Ibid. 
160 Kovatcheva, UN Convention Against Corruption,  
161 “Tainted Bulgarian Judge Postpones Oath of Office,” Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative,   
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 Bulgarian president, who refused to be present while she was sworn into office—a 
mandatory requirement by law—kept her from taking the oath of office.162   
3. Grand Corruption and Ties to Organized Crime 
Judges and law enforcement officials are not the only public stewards not trusted 
by the majority of the citizenry.  The general public believes that many of the country’s 
political elite are unduly influenced by organized criminal elements.  Moreover, there is a 
fear that some “have not only failed to prevent the spread of criminality but in some cases 
have actively assisted criminals…An essential condition for the [continued] existence of 
organized crime is the presence of enduring corrupt links between the criminal groups 
and the state (politicians, MPs, magistrates and representatives of the administration).”163  
Former Bulgarian counterintelligence chief and member of parliament Atanas Atanasov 
believes that state and criminal interests are inseparably linked.  He was quoted as saying 
that “other countries have the mafia, in Bulgaria the mafia has the country.”164  His 
assessment is not unfounded as investigations into criminal activity regularly turn up the 
name of politicians who are eventually implicated in the wrongdoing.165 
A prime example is the case of Alexander Filipov, who in July 2009 was the 
deputy minister for emergency situations in the Bulgarian executive.  He was arrested on 
charges of abusing his office in order to buy “votes in exchange for assigning EU-funded 
projects…Filipov was under investigation for corruption, embezzlement, vote trading and 
mismanagement of projects financed by both European funds and the state budget.”166  
More recently in January 2011, Maria Murgina, the country’s previous tax chief—
comparable to our head of the IRS—was sentenced to four years prison time for four 
separate counts of abuse of power and filing untrue statements while she was in office 
from 2005–2009.  “She [was] forced to resign after being accused of covering up alleged 
162 Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, “Tainted Bulgarian Judge Postpones Oath of Office”; 
“Bulgarian President Blocks Tainted Judge's Constitution Court Bid,” Sofia News Agency, November 15, 
2012, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=145138.  
163 “OC grows stronger in Bulgaria,” Jane’s,   
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166 “Bulgarian Deputy Arrested, Jane’s. 
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 fraud by businessmen who used fake companies to drain millions from the state 
budget.”167  Later in May of that year, a prosecutor in the Sofia court system was given a 
five-year sentence for colluding with the same individual he was supposed to be 
indicting.  The now former court official was accused of receiving an €12,500 kickback 
from a local businessman who wanted an ongoing investigation into his activities to be 
halted.  A few months later, in the summer of 2011, the then deputy minister of the 
interior was sentenced to a two-year suspended sentence for helping coordinate a 100,000 
leva—equivalent of $70,000—bribe between a businessman and the head of Bulgaria’s 
Fishing Agency.168 
There are even more examples of political elite involvement.  In July 2012, 
Dimitar Avramov, an MP in Bulgaria’s ruling GERB party was arrested for accepting 
bribes in excess of 100,000 leva.  Avramov and “two other men were arrested after 
50,000 levs changed hands…The dispute involved the use of land which is eligible for 
EU farm subsidies and thus highly sought after.”169  Avramov’s parliamentary immunity 
will have to first be removed before authorities can begin prosecution.  More recently in 
March 2013, Miroslav Naidenov was arrested for corruption and misuse of office while 
he was serving as the country’s agricultural minister in 2010.  He was accused of 
attempting to bribe a subordinate and trying to enrich himself and others through illegal 
means.  Specifically, authorities say that Naidenov gave preferential treatment “to a food 
producer to win a tender in 2010 to supply an European Union-backed program to 
distribute food to disadvantaged people…He was also charged with promising a bribe of 
200,000 levs…to a senior official at the state agricultural fund which disburses EU aid to 
farmers…[He also put] pressure on the official to sign orders granting a tax refund to two 
167 “Bulgaria’s Ex-Tax Chief Sentenced for Corruption,” Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, January 
25, 2011, http://www.rai-see.org/news/south-eastern-europe/3360-bulgarias-ex-tax-chief-sentenced-for-
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 domestic food producers.”170  Less than a month later, Stanimir Florov, ironically serving 
as the chief of Bulgaria’s anti-mafia bureau (GDBOP), was himself arrested on 
corruption charges after emerging documents revealed that he had routinely sheltered 
drug traffickers between 1999 and 2002 in exchange for immense financial gain.  Florov 
became chief of the GDBOP in 2009, but had worked as a senior member of the 
department during the time in question.  Prosecutors claim that Florov “had irregular 
dealings with drug traffickers and traffickers of other illegal goods…[and] agreed to warn 
drug traffickers ahead of police operations, receiving 20,000 Deutsche Marks (10,000 
euros, $13,000)—the preferred currency at the time—for each warning.  He also agreed 
to verify if Interpol was tracking cars that had been stolen in the visa-free Schengen 
zone.”171  Due to his previous ties with criminals, it is very probable that Florov was less 
than diligent in his duties during his time as chief of the GDBOP.172 
Events in the spring and summer of 2013 indicate that Bulgaria may have reached 
the tipping point when it comes to political elite corruption as massive crowds took to the 
streets in Sofia to protest several dubious governmental appointments for public office.   
Already inflamed by a series of political scandals surrounding the resignation of Prime 
Minister Boyko Borisov in February, crowds gathered for close to a month in front of the 
capital’s government buildings, voicing their displeasure with the affairs of government 
by chanting and holding signs that read “step down” and “mafia.”  The most shocking 
appointment attempt was Selyan Peevski, who was appointed as the head of the 
Bulgarian secret service.  “The 33 year-old is an influential and powerful media mogul, 
said to be involved in illegal business who maintains links to the mafia.”173  Peevski had 
previously served as the chief of the ministry of emergency situations until 2007, when 
170 “Bulgaria Ex-Minister Faces Corruption Charge Over EU Food Scheme,” Regional Anti-
Corruption Initiative, March 26, 2013, http://www.rai-see.org/news/south-eastern-europe/3626-bulgaria-ex-
minister-faces-corruption-charge-over-eu-food-scheme.html.    
171 “Bulgarian Anti-Mafia Chief Charged with Corruption,” Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, 
April 19, 2013, http://www.rai-see.org/news/south-eastern-europe/3685-bulgarian-anti-mafia-chief-
charged-with-corruption.html.  
172 Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, “Bulgarian Anti-Mafia Chief Charged with Corruption”;  
Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, Bulgaria Arrests Lawmaker for Taking Bribes”; Regional Anti-
Corruption Initiative, “Bulgarian Ex-Minister Faces Corruption Charge.” 
173 Ranya Breuer, “Time Is Up: Corruption and Its Economic Consequences,” Deutsche Welle, July 
27, 2013, http://www.dw.de/time-is-up-corruption-and-its-economic-consequences/a-16979160.  
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 he came under investigation for embezzlement and corruption—though charges were 
never filed.  When the newly elected government “fast tracked his appointment…and 
even amended certain laws to match Peevski’s profile with the job,”174 outraged citizens 
took to the streets in protest.  Agitated protesters continued their demonstrations even 
after Peevski voluntarily stepped down from office a week later.  Remarkably, Peevski’s 
appointment was not the only questionable announcement that angered the public.  
“Other appointments by the government also led people to believe that oligarchs were 
being favored.”175  For instance, Ivan Ivanov’s tenure of office as the deputy minister of 
the interior lasted only three hours before allegations linking him to organized crime led 
to his resignation.176  
E. CROATIA 
1. Introduction 
Croatia is one of the least corrupt countries in the Balkans, as measured by the 
World Bank and other watchdog groups like TI.  This is likely one of the major reasons 
why Croatia became only the fourth Southeast European country to be admitted to the 
EU, joining Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania as members of the prestigious group on 1 
July 2013.  Yet, many are worried that Croatia was admitted to the EU too soon and that 
all compulsory measures that could have forced Zagreb to further reduce its corruption 
have now been removed.  Despite many recent steps in the right direction, many believe 
that too much of the government is still influenced by connections to powerful criminal 
groups that cultivate corruption among the county’s top politicians.  Numerous corruption 
cases in recent years that involve the country’s political elite lend a lot of credence to this 
viewpoint.  Additionally, several instances of brutality and retribution against those who 
raise the issue of political corruption further hinder the country’s ability to conduct major 
reforms.    
174 Bistra Seiler and Emiliyan Lilov, “Bulgarians Protest Government of 'Oligarchs',” Deutsche Welle, 
June 26, 2013, http://www.dw.de/bulgarians-protest-government-of-oligarchs/a-16909751.  
175 Ibid. 
176 Seiler and Lilov, “Bulgarians Protest Government of 'Oligarchs'”; Breuer, “Time Is Up: 
Corruption”; Angelov, Ivan.  “Boyko Borisov Resigned.”  New Europe Online, Accessed August 26, 2013, 
http://www.neurope.eu/article/boyko-borisov-resigned.  
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 2. Accession to the European Union 
Croatia became the newest member of the EU in July when it became the first 
country in six years to be admitted to the European community of nations since Bulgaria 
and Romania joined in 2007.  Although Croatia’s World Bank rating had been among the 
highest in the region—trailing only Slovenia—for the past decade, the EU still subjected 
the country to increased scrutiny prior to granting it entrance into the union.  This was 
quite a different process than when Bulgaria and Romania entered the EU—both of these 
countries received the greater part of their scrutiny after they were already members.  
Conversely, “unlike Bulgaria and Romania, Croatia will not be subject to post-admission 
monitoring. The protection of reforms already in place and the success of future reforms 
rest with Croatia itself.”177  Many critics are pessimistic about Zagreb’s future in fighting 
corruption now that they have gotten the carrot and are no longer subject to the stick.  
Monitoring groups point out that the majority of the country’s reforms were passed at the 
last minute in order to meet the EU’s timetable and have not been adequately tested. 178  
Interestingly, despite Zagreb’s relatively high rankings by the World Bank, the 
average “Croat’s confidence in their national government [has been] the lowest in the 
region”179 for many years.  Although attitudes towards government are generally quite 
negative throughout the region, Croatia’s discontent is unique and is linked to the 
country’s distinct culture and history.  For hundreds of years, Croatians have seen 
themselves as tied to Central Europe and not to Southeast Europe.  Part of this association 
was Croatia’s Catholic heritage, which is unique within the Balkans.  More important, 
however, was Croatia’s centuries-old suzerainty under the Hapsburg—as opposed to the 
Ottoman—Empire that lasted until the conclusion of WWI.  Croatians have always 
viewed themselves as Central European and have looked down on Serbs and other 
Southern Slavs, who they view as inferior and beneath them.  Therefore, Croatian citizens 
177 Mujtaba Ali, “EU Entry May Not Change Corruption in Croatia,” Organized Crime and 
Corruption Reporting Project, June 30, 2015, https://reportingproject.net/occrp/index. php/en/ccwatch/cc-
watch-indepth/2030-eu-entry-may-not-change-corruption-in-croatia.  
178 Ali, “EU Entry May Not Change Corruption in Croatia”; “EU Newest Member Croatia Plagued by 
Economic Worries,” EUBusiness, August 4, 2013, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/croatia-
economy.q4y.  
179 Gallup, Insights and Perceptions, 13. 
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 are likely not content with having one of the least corrupt governments within the 
Balkans.  Instead, Croat expectations are shaped by the significantly less corrupt 
governments that dominate most of Western Europe.  These high standards are 
potentially an encouraging sign, hopefully signaling that the country’s citizens will help 
ensure that reforms continue to progress by holding their elected officials accountable.180 
Many see Croatia’s high rankings as a reflection of the continued progress made by law 
enforcement officials and the judicial system in the country’s ongoing mission to curb 
corruption.  There have been convictions in many “high-level corruption cases.  Even 
more importantly, Zagreb’s ruling elite has shown the political will to extend the fight 
against corruption to the highest echelons of power.  The conviction of former Prime 
Minister Ivo Sanader on bribe-taking charges is one prime example…Sanader’s 
indictment has made Croatia something of a model.”181  While Croatia should be 
commended for prosecuting its corrupt prime minister, that distinction is a bit of a 
double-edged sword.  It highlights the fact that corruption is pervasive and able to 
infiltrate to the absolute highest level of government.  This permeation of corruption has 
led some to conclude that “if it [Croatia] is a model for the Balkans, then the whole 
region is condemned to failure”182 in the future.183 
3. Links between the Political Elite and Organized Crime 
The arrest and eventual conviction of Ivo Sanader validated “a belief in the minds 
of many Croats that their country is in the grip of [a] powerful mafia whose roots lie in 
the international embargo against Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.”184  Many of the 
criminals from that time are the influential and prosperous businessmen operating a “so-
called gray economy that some estimate is equal to nearly a third of official GDP”185 
180 Hupchick, Balkans, 197–199; Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great 
Powers 1804–1999 (New York: Viking Press, 2001), 637. 
181 Likmeta, “A Specter is Haunting the Balkans.” 
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 these days.  Similar to the same saying in Bulgaria, Croatians “like to say that where Italy 
is a state with a mafia, Croatia is a mafia with a state.”186  Even before Sanader’s arrest, 
few doubted that there were considerable connections between elements of organized 
crime and the country’s political elite.  His conviction on corruption charges only served 
to cement that belief in the consciousness of most citizens.187  Ivo Sanader, who served as 
Croatia’s Prime Minster from 2004 until 2009, is the most prolific and high-ranking 
official in the Balkans to be tried and convicted on corruption charges.    Prosecutors filed 
a total of five indictments for corruption, embezzlement, and accepting bribes against the 
former head of state.  Among other things, he was accused of “receiving €545,000 
($695,000) in kickbacks for a credit deal with [the] Hypo Alpe Adria Group that gave the 
Austrian bank a leading position in Croatia.”188  Additionally, authorities say that he 
accepted an illegal bribe of over 70 million kuna ($13 million) from MOL—a Hungarian 
oil company—in exchange for ensuring that MOL received full management rights over 
INA—Croatia’s state-run oil company.  Sanader was sentenced to 10 years in prison in 
November 2012 for his involvement in the MOL scandal.189 
In a separate indictment, prosecutors also produced evidence showing that the 
former PM had directed “state-owned companies to make payments to Fimi Meidija, a 
Croatian marketing firm, often for fictitious services…The owner of the company then 
allegedly passed on the payments to HDZ [Sanader’s ruling party] slush funds.”190  In a 
fourth indictment, Sanader was accused of defrauding the Croatian government out of 
26.4 million kuna.  Sanader unduly used his influence at an inner cabinet meeting to 
convince the regional development ministry to purchase real estate located in an upscale 
186 Ibid. 
187 EUBusiness, “EU Newest Member Croatia Plagued by Economic Worries”; Srdoc and Samy, 
“Corruption in Croatia.” 
188 “Former Croatian PM Ivo Sanader Sentenced to 10 Years on Corruption Charges,” Croatian Anti-
Corruption Portal, November 20, 2012, http://www.anticorruption-croatia.org/home/news-from-
croatia/175-former-croatian-prime-minister-ivo-sanader-sentenced-to-10-years-on-corruption-charges.  
189 Croatian Anti-Corruption Portal, “Former Croatian PM Ivo Sanader Sentenced to 10 Years on 
Corruption Charges”; “Former Croatian Premier Pleads Not Guilty to Corruption Charges,” Deutsche 
Welle, April 16, 2012, http://www.dw.de/former-croatian-premier-pleads-not-guilty-to-corruption-
charges/a-15885824. 
190 Deutsche Welle, “Former Croatian Premier Pleads Not Guilty.” 
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 neighborhood of the capital at an outrageously inflated price.  A company owned by 
Sander and a few other businessmen had previously appraised the building at almost 
twice its actual value.  After the sale, the man who purchased the building admitted to 
personally delivering 17 million kuna directly to the PM. “He also showed investigators a 
place on his estate where he was hiding some of Sanader's valuable works of art which 
police”191 had been searching for.192 
Although he is the most senior official, Sanader is not the only member of the 
Croatian political elite to be accused of corruption and connections with organized crime.  
In late 2009, the deputy prime minister and minister of economy, Damir Polancec, 
resigned after corruption allegations were leveled concerning his involvement with the 
country’s largest food producer, the Podravka Company.  Polancec had previously been a 
high-ranking executive of Podravka, which is partially owned by the state.  It is estimated 
that corruption cost the company close to 35 million euros.193  Polancec was apprehended 
by the authorities for suspicion in the Podravka case, but was never formally tried for his 
involvement; however, he was convicted on a separate abuse of power charge in 2010 
and given 15 months in prison.194 
Another high-profile case in January 2012 involved the minister of the interior, 
Berislav Roncevic.  He was accused of abusing his position while serving as the minister 
of defense.  Authorities say that Roncevic, and his assistant Ivo Bacic, defrauded the state 
of millions of kunas in a 2004 military truck contract.  Roncevic was ultimately 
sentenced to four years of prison time for his involvement.  A few months later, the state 
brought charges against another former minister of the interior, Ivica Kirin.  Kirin was 
191 “Fifth Indictment Filed Against Former Prime Minister Sanader,” Croatian Anti-Corruption Portal, 
September 1, 2012, http://www.anticorruption-croatia.org/home/news-from-croatia/161-fifth-indictment-
filed-against-former-prime-minister-sanader.  
192 Croatian Anti-Corruption Portal, “Fifth Indictment Filed Against Former Prime Minister 
Sanader”; Croatian Anti-Corruption Portal, “Former Croatian PM Ivo Sanader sentenced”; Deutsche Welle, 
“Former Croatian Premier Pleads Not Guilty.” 
193 The government of Croatia still owns a 26 percent share of the company; that makes the 
government’s share of the loss equal to 9.1 million Euros. 
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 charged with corruption that prosecutors “say cost the country more than 2.5m euros.”195  
Kirin had previously served as Croatia’s interior minister from 2005 to 2007, when he 
was forced to resign after being photographed taking a hunting trip with a known 
criminal.196 
On 2 August 2013—just a month after the country’s admission to the EU—the 
Croatian anti-corruption bureau arrested the Vukovar County police chief, his deputy, 
and seven other officers on charges of giving and receiving bribes.  The chief, Blaz 
Topalovic, and his men were accused of “smuggling illegal immigrants to and from 
Croatia for money.  Vukovar County is in the east of the country and borders Serbia—an 
EU frontier since Croatia joined the European club last month.”197   
4. Fear of Exposing Corruption 
As previously documented, connections between organized crime and the political 
elite go all the way to the highest echelons of power in Croatia.  Powerful criminals will 
go to great lengths to ensure that their profits continue to come in unimpeded; and they 
are also more likely to take aggressive action if they know they will be protected by 
powerful officials in public office and law enforcers who are also implicated in the illegal 
behavior.  In the past this has rightfully left many media personnel and public servants 
hesitant to expose and prosecute corruption in Croatia.  These individuals have fears that 
range from lost jobs or ruined careers, all the way to bodily injury or even death.  There 
are numerous documented cases of individuals suffering each of the above outcomes for 
simply doing their jobs. 
A former minister of justice, Vesna Skare Ozbolt claimed that “her efforts to 
reform the judiciary and hold corrupt politicians accountable led to her dismissal”198 by 
195 Karadaku, “Kosovo Arrest.” 
196 Karadaku, “Kosovo Arrest”; “Trial Begins Against Croatia’s Roncevic,” Croatian Anti-Corruption 
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 Prime Minister Ivo Sanader in 2006.  Other individuals have refused to do their job out of 
fear for their life.   Reporter Goran Flauder—who maintains that he has been physically 
attacked six times for his hard-hitting articles on organized crime—stated that on more 
than one occasion the “state prosecutor to whom he took his findings refused to pursue 
the cases for fear of being killed himself.”199  Those public officials that do prosecute 
crime sometimes face appalling consequences.  In 2008, authorities discovered the body 
of Ivana Hodak, the daughter of a recognized prosecutor in Zagreb, in the stairwell 
outside her apartment building.  Hodak, 26 years of age, had seemingly been shot to 
death as a message to her father.  Astonishingly, police pinned the murder on a lone 
homeless man.200 
After a series of death threats and murder attempts were directed against reporters 
and journalists over the past few years, many individuals carrying out investigations on 
allegedly corrupt individuals must rely on police or private security protection.  “One of 
the victims, Dusan Miljus, a leading journalist who writes about organized crime, was 
beaten with a baseball bat by two assailants and hospitalized for serious head injuries.  
The perpetrators were never caught.”201  In another instance, a car bomb killed an 
outspoken reporter who had frequently targeted organized crime and corruption.  Ivo 
Pukanic had courageously been one of the first to implicate Prime Minister Ivo Sander 
before he was officially charged with his previously discussed crimes.  Pukanic’s 
writings drew attention to Sanader’s “unexplained wealth...[pointing out that] the prime 
minister own[ed] $200,000 worth of wristwatches—and accus[ed] him of illegally 
seizing private property.”202  However, it was most likely “his stories about a Balkan 
cigarette smuggling operation which cost him his life.”203     
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 F. KOSOVO 
1. Introduction 
Kosovo is the smallest and newest country in the Balkans.  It split from Serbia 
and became an independent country only in 2008.  Since its inception, it has vied with 
Albania for the lowest World Bank control of corruption ranking in the region—Kosovo 
was dead last every year until 2011 when it was able to surpass Albania by the smallest 
of margins.  It is not surprising that the two countries have similar problems since ethnic 
Albanians make up over 85 percent of the Kosovar population.  This makes Pristina 
susceptible to the same corrupting influences of pervasive Albanian organized crime 
groups that plague Tirana.  Similar to all other countries in the region, Kosovo has a 
documented history of high-level politicians with illegal connections to criminal groups.  
However, because of Kosovo’s small size—its land area is only about twenty percent 
larger than the New York City metro area—and its relatively short existence, there are 
not as many examples as there are in the other countries of the region.204 
2. Connections between Organized Crime and the Political Elite 
Pristina is subject to the same problems that plague other capital cities in the 
Balkans.  Unfortunately for Kosovar citizens, the connections between organized crime 
and the political elite begin at the very top of the government.  Hashim Thaci, who was 
elected to his second term as prime minister in 2011, had previously been “linked to 
organized crime and organ trafficking…by the Council of Europe.  The claims date back 
to when he was a leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) which fought against 
Serb forces.  It is alleged that the KLA sold the organs of their civilian captives.”205  
Thaci was also reported to be a central figure in the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a 
group composed of ex-KLA leaders that maintained a monopoly of force within the 
country by utilizing intimidation and violence to seize and maintain political control, and 
were financed by extorting money from legal businessmen.  In 2011, Thaci formed a 
204 Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Kosovo,” accessed August 8, 2013. 
http://www.britannica.com/ EBchecked/topic/322726/Kosovo. 
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 coalition government with Behgjet Pacolli, who was elected president for a short time.  
Like Thaci, Pacolli has a questionable history and is suspected of conducting extra-legal 
business transactions in the past.  “Allegations…surround previous business dealings of 
[the] millionaire construction tycoon … [who is] owner of the Swiss-based construction 
company Mabetex…[he] is widely considered to be the richest man in Kosovo.”206  
Pacolli was forced to step down after Kosovo’s Constitutional Court declared his election 
as president to be invalid; however, he is still in a very powerful position as he is 
currently the country’s first deputy prime minister.207 
Thaci and Pacolli are not the only two prominent politicians to have ties to 
organized crime.  In May 2013, Fahrudin Radonic—the Albanian state minister of 
security—was identified as a business associate of Naser Kelmendi after the latter was 
arrested for murder and drug trafficking charges.  Kelmendi, whom the U.S. had 
previously identified for sanctions under the Kingpin Act208, was “known to be close to 
politicians and businessmen in the region.”209  Two months later in July, Kosovo courts 
ruled that Fatmir Limaj, Nexhat Krasniqi, and Endrit Shala—the former minister of 
transport and telecommunications, his former head of procurement, and former chief of 
staff, respectively—had “founded an organized criminal group that committed serious 
criminal acts of misconduct and bribery…manipulating tender procedures, giving and 
receiving bribes and obstructing evidence in relation to three tenders…for personal or 
206 Ibid. 
207 Nicholas Wood, “Kosovo Gripped by Racketeers,” BBC News, April 5, 2000, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/699175.stm.  
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 material benefit in the period between 2008 and 2010”210 while they were in office.  The 
courts estimated they cost the state approximately 2 million euros.211 
Lastly, in April 2012, authorities arrested Special Prosecutor Nazmi Mustafi—
who was serving as Kosovo’s anti-corruption task force chief—on charges of corruption.  
“The arrest of Mustafi is a particular embarrassment for Pristina because he was the 
person—appointed by Prime Minister Hashim Thaci in 2010—to put an end to 
corruption.  Instead, prosecutors say, he profited from it.”212  Unfortunately, this criminal 
participation by the very individuals that are supposed to be clamping down on organized 
crime and corruption is emblematic of the substantial problem facing Kosovo and the rest 
of the region.213 
G. SERBIA 
1. Introduction 
Serbia has had considerable difficulties controlling its corruption problems in the 
past.  Serbia started the millennium with the region’s worst World Bank control of 
corruption ranking; however, to its credit, by 2011 Serbia had improved considerably and 
was ranked only slightly behind Croatia and Bulgaria and considerably ahead of the rest 
of Southeast Europe.  Even so, Belgrade faces significant challenges in the future as it 
attempts to further reduce corruption in its efforts to gain entrance to the EU.  One major 
hurdle is that the country’s “economy still remains captive to oligarchs who made their 
fortunes during the Milosevic era.”214  There are also several examples of grand 
corruption among the government’s political elite.  Most disturbing, however, are the 
210 “Kosovo Ex-Minister Limaj to Face Corruption Trial,” Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, July 
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 connections that senior members of the government have to well-known criminal figures, 
raising “serious questions about the influence of organized crime in Serbian politics.”215   
2. Economy Controlled by Oligarchs 
More than a decade after Slobodan Milosevic resigned as president of Yugoslavia, 
his legacy continues to trouble his native country.  Powerful businessmen who made their 
connections and built their fortunes during his rule continue to maintain a stranglehold on 
the Serbian economy by curbing outside foreign investment, limiting import licenses, and 
passing on inflated prices to Serbian consumers.  There is no better example of this than 
Miroslav Miskovic.  The 68 year-old Miskovic is not only the richest man in Serbia—
with a net estimated value of 2.2 billion euros—but as the owner and president of the 
Belgrade-based Delta M Holding Corporation, he is also the country’s largest single 
private employer.  Incredibly, Miskovic controls nearly 70 percent of the capital’s 
available retail space.216  
Miskovic’s rapid rise to the top began immediately following the fall of 
communism and the privatization of the region’s economy.  In 1990, he forged lasting 
relationships with many of the country’s political elite when he served for six months as 
Serbia’s deputy prime minister.  After serving as minister, he opened the Delta M 
Corporation, which quickly grew to be the largest company in the country. It is purported 
that part of Miskovic’s success throughout the years came “by buying influence through 
the financing of political parties…Dozens of Serbian politicians are suspected of 
receiving monthly allowances worth tens of thousands of euros from the tycoon.”217  
Verica Berac, Serbia’s anti-corruption commissioner supported this perception in 2010 
when she stated that “oligarchs and various government bodies are inextricably 
interlinked.”218  To many, Miskovic was thought to be invincible.219   
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  Therefore, it came as a great surprise to most Serbians when Miskovic, his 
son, and eight other associates were arrested in December 2012 “on charges of abusing 
several privatization deals for road construction and maintenance companies.  According 
to Serbian prosecutors, he [Miskovic] is suspected of illegally obtaining more than E30 
million.”220  Serbia’s ability to successfully and fairly prosecute the country’s most 
notorious tycoon could have major implications for its bid to join the EU in the future.  
Miskovic is almost as prominent a figure as Prime Minister Ivo Sanader was in Croatia, 
and this upcoming trial will reveal a lot about which direction Serbia is heading in.221 
3. Political Elite Corruption 
Serbia, like all the other countries of the Balkans, has suffered from grand 
corruption by members of the country’s political elite.  The most prominent example is 
the October 2012 indictment of Oliver Dulic—then cabinet minister of environment, 
mining, and spatial planning and former president of the national assembly—who was 
accused, along with two of his colleagues, of abuse of office while awarding construction 
contracts in 2009 and 2010.  In April 2013, the Serbian Office of the Organized Crime 
Prosecutor (OOCP) filed another indictment against Dulic, this time for the “abuse of 
office related to the issuing of work licenses to the Slovenian [optic cable] company 
Nuba Invest.”222  In another high-profile case, Sasa Dragin—the minister of agriculture, 
forestry, and water management from 2008 to 2011—was arrested in November 2012 on 
corruption charges.  He and eight others are suspected of committing “fraud at 
Agrobanka [a Serbian bank] during the previous government’s term.  The case allegedly 
involves around €300m worth of fraudulent loans, and reportedly cost the state about 
€4.5m.”223  Anonymous sources in government suggest that the Agrobanka case might 
219 Deutsche Welle, “Serbian Oligarchies Under Scrutiny”; Likmeta, “The Fall of a Tycoon Stuns 
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 have connections that potentially lead back to the aforementioned tycoon Miroslav 
Miskovic.224 
4. Governmental Ties to Powerful Criminals 
The most serious threat to political legitimacy in Serbia is not the result of an 
arrest or legal indictment but concerns accusations of relationships and connections 
between powerful criminals and elected leaders at the highest level of government.  Ivica 
Toncev—Serbia’s National Security Advisor (NSA)—is accused of maintaining “contact 
with major organized crime figures since before 2008 when he entered 
government…having long-time relationships with the underworld in Austria and 
Serbia.”225  Ostensibly, Prime Minister Iva Dacic was aware of Toncev’s connections 
prior to appointing him to the critical position for his first term in office; however, there 
is no doubt that the PM was aware of “Toncev’s criminal connections before he 
appointed him to his staff a second time after the 2012 election…American and Russian 
embassy officials expressed their concern about Toncev holding such an important 
position.  Other European embassies including the French, German and English 
expressed similar concerns.”226  Yet despite the similar warnings by representatives of 
countries that find it hard to agree on many issues, and the fact that Toncev lacked any 
practical experience in politics, government, security, or public policy issues, PM Dacic 
was undeterred.227 
 Prior to moving to Serbia, Ivica Toncev lived in Austria where he was a 
business partner with a renowned Montenegrin Mafioso named Branislav Saranovic.  
Details are sketchy, but apparently Toncev sold the Austrian-based construction company 
224 Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, “Former Serbian Agriculture Minister Arrested on Corruption 
Charges”; “Serb Lawmaker Accused of Corruption Stripped of Immunity,” Regional Anti-Corruption 
Initiative, October 8, 2012, http://www.rai-see.org/news/south-eastern-europe/3047-serb-lawmaker-
accused-of-corruption-stripped-of-immunity.html; OOCRP, “Serbia: Former Minister Indicted.” 
225 Stevan Dojčinović et al., “Serbian PM Was Warned Of Tončev’s Mafia Ties,” Organized Crime 
and Corruption Reporting Project, July 1, 2013, https://reportingproject.net/occrp/ index.php 
/en/ccwatch/cc-watch-indepth/2034-serbian-pm-was-warned-of-tonevs-mafia-ties.  
226 Ibid. 
227 Dojčinović et al., “Serbian PM Was Warned Of Tončev’s Mafia Ties”; Dojčinović et al., “Advisor 
to Serbian PM.” 
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 Fil Sar to Saranovic in 2006; however, Toncev stayed on as the acting director and 
operations manager—even while he was serving as the Serbian NSA—until August 2009.  
Saranovic was an influential crime boss “known in law enforcement circles as an 
important figure tied to Group America, a low-profile but prosperous Montenegrin 
cocaine smuggling group…In 2009 he was gunned down in Belgrade in a mob style hit 
by a crew of killers carrying automatic weapons.”228  Unfortunately, Toncev’s 
underworld connections stretch beyond this one individual.  Toncev is also a former 
business partner of Milutin Markovic—an international drug dealer who is an underling 
to one of Western Europe’s biggest cocaine smugglers.  Toncev also has a longstanding 
friendship with Nenad Milenkovic—a known heroin dealer.  Both Toncev and 
Milenkovic hail from the small town of Surdulica where there they first met.  Toncev’s 
connections to Saranovic, Markovic, Milenkovic, and other known criminals “mudd[y] 
the waters of Serbian politics further, and call[] into question the relationship between 
organized crime, Toncev, and Serbian Prime Minister Dacic.”229  This problematic issue 
will surely have to be addressed before the country is given serious consideration for EU 
membership.230  
H. CONCLUSION 
While not all six countries examined here were direct participants in the series of 
wars that racked Southeast Europe in the 1990s, the robust relationships that were forged 
during that period between organized criminals and the region’s political elite still trouble 
every nation within the Balkans.  These harmful associations have produced a region 
where political corruption is pervasive and rule of law is diminished.  This illegal 
behavior is not a minor issue involving only low and mid-level officials; instead, it is a 
problem that often reaches the highest levels of government and is undertaken by the 
most powerful individuals within the country.  The previously documented examples 
228 Stevan Dojčinović et al., “Serbian PM Was Warned of Toncev’s Mafia Ties.” 
229 “Tončev Faces Probe Following OCCRP/CINS Revelations.”  Organized Crime and Corruption 
Reporting Project, February 8, 2013, https://reportingproject.net/occrp/index. php/en/ccwatch/cc-watch-
briefs/1827-tonev-faces-probe-following-occrpcins-revelations.  
230 Dojčinović et al., “Advisor to Serbian PM.”;  Stevan Dojčinović et al., “Serbian PM Was Warned 
of Toncev’s Mafia Ties.” 
 70 
                                                 
 show that nearly every country has suffered a political scandal involving its head of 
state—or deputy—in the past decade.  Additionally, there are numerous other examples 
of misconduct by individuals holding office within the executive cabinet or federal 
legislature.  Deplorably, a weak—or even worse corrupt—judiciary that often lacks the 
political will to effectively prosecute dishonest leaders only exacerbates the rampant 
corruption problem.  In some countries—Serbia being the best example—the permissive 
environment has led to an economic environment dominated by oligarchs.  In Croatia—
though likely to exist in the other countries as well, even if not documented in news 
articles—the state of affairs has created a situation where many in the media are hesitant 
to point out corrupt officials because they fear retribution and bodily harm.  Taken as a 
whole, the corruption problem within the region may seem hopeless.  But there are 
potential solutions that can help mitigate and address the problems.  To this issue we now 
turn our attention. 
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 V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the pervasive nature of corruption in the Balkans, governments in the 
region can implement solutions that could help drastically reduce the current problem.  
Balkan authorities should use incentives to help decrease the likelihood that individuals 
will take part in corrupt behavior; higher salaries, stronger punishments, and improved 
legislation will all increase the risk and lower the reward of politicians contemplating 
illegal actions.  Governments in Southeast Europe must also begin a campaign to change 
the public’s mindset about corruption.  These efforts should focus on the next generation, 
since children and young adults are more impressionable and have not already solidified 
their opinions and belief systems.  It is also important to increase international 
cooperation, not only among countries within the region, but also between Southeast 
European countries and Western Europe—and specifically with the EU.  This 
collaboration will help strengthen law enforcement and judiciary systems within the 
region.  It will also help Balkan countries further develop their democratic traditions.  
Additionally, Balkan governments should form strong relationships with NGOs that are 
proficiently equipped to take the lead in the fight on corruption.  Moreover, states should 
ensure the protection of the media so that journalists can feel relatively safe to report on 
corrupt activities.  Lastly, governments should be open to, and supportive of 
unconventional approaches that attempt to solve the persistent corruption problem that 
has endured despite repeated government efforts in the past.   
In his contribution to the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Force 2010 report, Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence: A 
Compendium of Best Practices, Naval Postgraduate Professor Francois Melese, suggests 
that all government efforts to reduce corruption “can be distilled into three main 
categories: Building integrity; Increasing transparency; and Improving accountability.”231  
231 Francois Melese, “A Strategic Approach to Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in 
Defence,” in Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence: A Compendium of Best Practices, ed. 
Todor Tagarev (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2010), 13. 
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 As such, each of the subsequent recommendations in this chapter advocates a policy that 
would help improve at least one of the above three broad categories.  Furthermore, the 
following recommendations are not specific to any one country, but apply to all nations 
within the region.        
B. USING MARKET INCENTIVES TO FIGHT CORRUPTION 
Most people—and by extension governments—view corruption as primarily an 
ethical issue and use predominantly moral denunciations to criticize crooked politicians.  
But corruption is as much about economics as it is about morality and “the tools of 
economics do better at making sense of it than do the insights offered by the study of 
ethics and morals.”232  In order to battle corruption, it is important for authorities to first 
understand the economic incentives that motivate individuals to partake in corrupt 
behavior.  The reason most politicians are corrupt is not that they are inherently evil; 
instead, most public figures are involved in corruption because of the incentives—usually 
monetarily—that are involved.  It is a simple matter of risk and reward.  When the 
possibility of being caught is low—or the consequences are insignificant even if one is 
caught, public officials are more likely to be corrupt.  And once a politician has 
successfully benefited from compromising his office, he is more likely to be emboldened 
to continue his unscrupulous behavior in the future.233 
Currently, the fight against corruption in the Balkans “pits the force of 
governments against the force of the market.  History and common sense say that, in the 
long run, market forces tend to prevail over those of governments.”234  Therefore, it 
would be wise for administrations in the region to enlist the help of incentives in their 
campaign against corruption by taking actions that reduce enticements for corrupt 
behavior; higher salaries for government workers, stronger punishments for lawbreakers, 
better whistle-blower laws, and improved legislation would all be positive steps that 
232 Naim, Illicit, 239. 
233 Ibid., 84, 239. 
234 Ibid., 222, 223. 
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 could help decrease the likelihood that public officials will become involved with 
corruption. 
1. Higher Salaries Would Help Build Integrity 
The countries of the Balkans—which maintained government planned, command-
based economies for the better part of five decades—trail Western Europe on almost 
every major economic indicator.  Wages and per capita gross domestic product (GDP) are 
lower, while unemployment and poverty are higher in the region than they are in the 
more prosperous West.  For middle and lower-class public officials in less prosperous 
areas like Southeast Europe, “corruption is to great extent a survival strategy.  In these 
countries, increasing personal income is a strong motive and is becoming stronger due to 
conditions of utter deprivation and low public sector salaries.”235  The acceptance of 
bribes is often seen as an effective way for officials to increase their salary or even as a 
way to simply make ends meet. Alternatively, public officials who are paid a higher wage 
would be less susceptible to corruption.  This is especially important for law enforcement 
personnel, prosecutors, and magistrates whose jobs focus specifically on combating 
corruption.  These individuals “should be well-paid to avoid them [sic] being tempted to 
collaborate with wrong-doers.”236  Admittedly, paying higher public salaries is an idea 
that in reality is constrained by already tight state-budgets; however, the cost of organized 
crime and corruption to each country in the region is millions in lost revenue and taxes 
each year.  Therefore, making the initial investment to pay public officials up front could 
lead to increased revenue in the future with the idea of higher salaries ultimately paying 
for itself.237 
235 Sioussiouras and Vavouras, “Political Rights, Development, and Corruption,” 102. 
236 Friends of Europe, Counter-Measures in the Balkans, 5. 
237 Friends of Europe, Counter-Measures in the Balkans, 27; EUBusiness, “EU Newest Member 
Croatia Plagued by Economic Worries”; Engel, “Practical Guide,” 1; “Report says Corruption Slows 
Progress on Organized Crime,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, March 13, 2012, 
https://reportingproject.net/occrp/index.php/en/ccwatch/cc-watch-briefs/1404-report-says-c. 
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 2. Stronger Punishments and Confiscation of Illegal Proceeds Would 
Help Improve Accountability 
Governments not only should make officials less susceptible to corruption, but 
should also discourage illicit activity by imposing stronger penalties on those who break 
the law.  In the examples listed in the previous chapter, it was quite common for high-
level public officials to receive sentences of less than five years for their participation in 
activities that sometimes profited them millions of dollars.  These sentences do little to 
deter bad behavior among those willing to take a risk.  “Crime should not pay, or be 
perceived as a winnable game of chance.”238  Instead of light sentences, prison terms for 
corrupt public officials should be “swift, certain, and severe.”239  The increased threat 
would deter many from participating because it would raise the risks compared to the 
rewards.  Additionally, governments in the region need to do a better job of seizing the 
profits and assets of those implicated in crime and corruption.  Currently, too many 
wrongdoers are not stripped of their illegal gains and are still able to benefit from the fruit 
of their crimes after serving their short sentences.  Passing laws that better enable the 
state to confiscate illegal gains would serve as an additional warning to politicians 
contemplating corruption.240  
The countries of Southeast Europe could also use the property and assets 
confiscated from corrupt politicians and organized criminals to improve social welfare.  
Italy adopted this approach to make the most out of real estate purchased by politicians 
and criminals who were attempting to launder their dirty money.  “Farms once owned by 
the Mafia have been used to provide work for individuals with special needs.  Villas have 
been used as social centers for children and for other functions in the community…the 
Sicilian experience…[helps] ensure that “crime does not pay” and properties that once 
served people who harmed others now serve the public good.”241  Besides providing a 
238 Engel, “Practical Guide,” 2. 
239 Friends of Europe, Counter-Measures in the Balkans, 13. 
240 Ibid., 6, 13, 16. 
241 Louis Shelly, “Money Laundering into Real Estate,” in Convergence: Illicit Networks and 
National Security in the Age of Globalization, eds. Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer, (Washington 
DC: National Defense University Press, 2013), 142. 
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benefit to social welfare, the continuous presence of these public spaces would also serve 
as a constant reminder to would-be offenders that crime and corruption in the Balkans do 
not pay.242 
3. Whistle-blower Laws and Improved Legislation Would Help Increase 
Transparency
Many countries within the Balkans do not have adequate—or in some cases any—
whistle-blower laws.  The lack of these regulations discourages individuals from 
reporting their knowledge of wrongdoing because the government does not provide them 
protection from potential retaliation by the person, group, or organization that they 
accused.  In some cases this retaliation can damage a career and in other cases it can lead 
to bodily harm.  Conversely, the presence of whistle-blower legislation would encourage 
“those with critical information, particularly about corruption matters…to disclose 
wrongful conduct without fear of official reprisal, and entitl[e] them to compensation and 
protections.”243  It is vitally important for all Southeast European countries to pass these 
laws as another deterrent against crime and corruption. 
Lawmakers in the Balkans also need to make further legislative improvements 
beyond the addition of whistle-blower laws and harsher penalties for offenders.  In some 
instances, it is actually the law—or the way the laws are written—that provides the 
incentives toward corrupt activities.  Certain regulations are so overly complex or 
bureaucratic that it is far easier for individuals to resort to bribery than it is to follow the 
proper procedures.  This bureaucracy also enables corrupt petty-officials to prey on 
citizens who become frustrated and fed up with the system.  The continued presence of 
red-tape regulations that encourage corrupt behavior among the population only serves to 
undermine the government’s efforts towards corruption reform.  Each country should 
take a hard look at these laws and rewrite them as necessary in a concerted effort to 
eliminate bureaucracy—and ultimately corruption.244    
242 Ibid. 
243 Engel, “Practical Guide,” 2. 
244 Ninua, Shining a Light, 7. 
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 C. CHANGING THE MINDSET OF THE POPULATION WOULD HELP 
BUILD INTEGRITY 
It is important to change the population’s attitude towards corruption because this 
will help decrease the number of individuals willing to participate in the illegal behavior.  
While it is important for the government to push programs that teach ethics in the 
workplace and attempt to increase the integrity and ethical standards of civil servants, the 
most significant efforts should focus on changing the mindset of the next generation.  
Although this approach will not reap benefits overnight—or even in a year or two—it has 
the potential to have long term, permanent effects on the problem within the region.  
Currently, a good portion of society living in the Balkans sees corruption as a normal way 
of life and not as a negative thing.  It is hard to change the opinions of grown adults, who 
are largely set in their ways, but young children and teenagers are more impressionable.  
The next generation must be taught not only that corruption is wrong and unacceptable, 
but also that it is harmful to society and lowers everyone’s economic welfare.  
Commenting on the criminal state’s attack on sovereignty, Michael Miklaucic reinforces 
this idea when he writes that “[t]oday’s challenge is about incentives and reinforcing the 
value of service in the public interest and the integrity of public administration.  These 
and other normative values must be incubated and fortified in schools, churches, and 
community organizations, and in the media through the disciplined application of 
incentives and disincentives.”245  In the span of a generation or two, children who have 
developed a reformed outlook on corruption will become the majority of the public 
servants within the region.  Additionally, the proportion of society that accepts corruption 
as a way of life will become increasingly smaller.  Ideally, this will result in a significant 
decrease in the amount of corruption in the Balkans.246 
D.  INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
In the current global environment, it is impossible for nations to remain isolated 
islands that attempt to address criminal problems themselves.  Problems that affect the 
245 Miklaucic and Naim, “The Criminal State,” 152. 
246 Engel, “Practical Guide,” 3; Chêne, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in BiH, 10. 
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 Balkans regularly spill over to other parts of the world, affecting Western Europe and 
even the United States; a perfect example is Albanian criminal Almir Rrappo from last 
chapter.  Crime and corruption are international phenomena that do not show any regard 
for national borders that must be respected by sovereign nations.  Borders actually help 
strengthen crime and cultivate increased opportunities for corruption among public 
officials.  In order for Southeast European countries to effectively fight their corruption 
problems, steps need to be taken in order to remove obstacles that restrict international 
cooperation; “it’s not only in all of our own interests, but it’s the right thing to do.  Crime 
does not respect borders, so if law enforcement is so bound, it can never win against 
crime.”247  It is a mutual benefit for all likeminded nations to help Balkan governments 
overcome their current crime and corruption problems.  Law enforcement agencies, 
judicial systems, and even the democratic process of all countries within the region can 
benefit from strong cooperation between the nations of the region themselves and from 
oversight by the EU and other International organizations.248 
1. Law Enforcement and Judiciary Cooperation Would Help Improve 
Accountability 
International cooperation among law enforcement agencies in the Balkans is 
essential to successful efforts aimed at reducing crime and corruption in the region.  
Many Southeast European policing agencies could benefit from “more specialized 
training from members of the international community (IC)…[this would also help] 
cement cross-country law enforcement cooperation and relations.”249  Some cross-
country endeavors—like regional arrest warrants that prevent criminals from using 
borders to evade apprehension—have already been created, but more efforts are needed.  
It is also important to ensure that politicians and criminals cannot use borders to protect 
the profits of their illegal activities.  This could be prevented by the formation of a “team 
247 Engel, “Practical Guide,” 2. 
248 OOCRP, “Organized Crime”; Naim, Illicit, 8; Friends of Europe, Counter-Measures in the 
Balkans, 8. 
249 Engel, “Practical Guide,” 1. 
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 of regional experts to help with freezing or confiscating illegally acquired assets,”250 
regardless of which country those assets reside in.251 
It is also important for the Balkan countries to synchronize their judicial structures 
with EU and international standards.  As mentioned before, this will help prevent 
individuals from using borders as an effective mechanism to help avoid prosecution.  
Additionally, all Balkan countries that have not already done so should realign their 
judicial systems, making the judiciary its own branch and not subordinate to an executive 
branch that can unduly influence the court’s decisions.  “Promoting an independent 
judiciary with the resources and capacity to fulfill its anticorruption and anti-organized 
crime mission”252 is absolutely necessary if countries hope to make further progress in 
their reform efforts.253 
2. Increased EU Oversight Would Help Increase Transparency  
The best motivation for international cooperation among the countries of 
Southeast Europe is the enticement of gaining entry into the EU.  The EU should 
maximize that opportunity to help make reforms in each and every country within the 
region.  Beyond requiring each country to stick to a proscribed deadline of achievements 
in order to continue on the path towards admission, the EU should also take more 
extensive measures to help produce reforms.  For instance, the EU could “send judges 
and prosecutors [to the region] who can assist in strengthening the rule of law and [who 
could help each nation establish] an independent judiciary.  The EU may also consider 
setting up an independent body to investigate allegations of corruption and look into how 
some politicians have come to their unexplained fortunes.”254  The EU could also 
predicate many of its loans and other financial aid packages on how well the countries are 
cooperating amongst themselves and with the IC at large.  It should be acknowledged that 
some could consider the level of EU involvement advocated above excessive.  
250 OOCRP, “Efforts to Fight Organized Crime.” 
251 OOCRP, “Efforts to Fight Organized Crime.” 
252 Chêne, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in BiH, 10.   
253 Friends of Europe, Counter-Measures in the Balkans, 8. 
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 Admittedly, it will take “some degree of flexibility with regard to the concept of national 
sovereignty”255 by the countries involved if there are to be meaningful improvements.  
But the benefits of admission to the EU are significant and most Balkan countries should 
be farsighted enough to endure such intrusive behavior.  Besides, the “most effective 
forms of cooperation…are also the ones that invite the most mutual scrutiny…[It is] 
naïve to assume that a government acting alone can make”256 the same amount of 
progress in its efforts at reducing corruption as it could with the assistance of 
international involvement; especially when such unilateral efforts have been relatively 
unsuccessful in the past.257         
3. Encouraging Strong Democracy Would Help Build Integrity, Increase 
Transparency, and Improve Accountability 
The countries of Southeast Europe are relatively young democracies when 
compared to Western Europe.  Most nations within the region are only a few decades 
removed from a long history of authoritarian rule and are still developing their own 
democratic traditions.  Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that governance within 
the Balkans has suffered its fair share of hiccups in the past two decades—to be fair, even 
countries with developed, mature democracies sometimes face the same types of 
problems.  However, the “main difference between developed and developing countries 
is that the former are mainly characterized by economic scandals while the latter are 
ridden with corruption.”258  Currently, the nations of Southeast Europe could accurately 
be described as “ridden with corruption.”  Even though all of the countries have adopted 
a democratic form of government, it takes time and democracy to help eliminate 
corruption, not just democracy alone.  The “decisive factor for ending corruption is the 
longevity of the system… [it is a ] democratic tradition and not just [the] adoption of a 
democratic regime that [is] decisive in containing or ending corruption…[it is] only after 
a certain time interval that democratic practices seem to contribute to corruption 
255 Naim, Illicit, 256. 
256 Naim, Illicit, 256, 257. 
257 OOCRP, “Efforts to Fight Organized Crime.” 
258 Sioussiouras and Vavouras, “Political Rights, Development, and Corruption,” 98. 
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 control.”259  Therefore, one of the biggest influences the EU can have over countries in 
the Balkans is to help encourage the continued growth of democracy in the region.  As 
the nations of Southeast Europe continue to develop, corruption should become less and 
less common and the region will begin to more closely reflect the established norms of 
the West.260 
E. CIVIL SOCIETY 
In the battle against corruption, governments cannot win the fight alone.  If efforts 
to reduce corruption are to be successful, a wide range of CSOs also has a significant role 
to play.  Private CSOs operate with a significant advantage over the public sphere; the 
same bureaucracy, rules, and procedures that constrain the actions of governments do not 
limit the measures taken by civil society groups.  Instead, CSOs are at liberty to take any 
action—within the law, of course—that can achieve positive results.  Unfortunately, 
CSOs are dependent on local governments for safety and security.  Governments in the 
region would be wise to support the efforts of these organizations by ensuring that they 
are “given encouragement, positive protection, and reinforcement…Police and 
prosecutors should make every effort to ensure the safety of the above organizations and 
personnel, and encourage their work and reporting.”261  The most important function for 
NGO monitoring groups and the media is reporting corruption in an impartial and 
unbiased manner and ensuring that the general public is properly informed.262 
1. NGOs Can Help Increase Transparency 
In the war on corruption, watchdog groups like TI, U4, and Corruption Watch 
(CW) are able to do many things that governments cannot.  While governments are 
constrained by national borders, NGOs have no such limitations.  Organizations like TI 
maintain offices in every country throughout the region and are not hampered by the 
same diplomatic procedures that guide the actions of sovereign nations.  Additionally, 
259 Ibid., 90. 
260 Ibid., 98, 101, 103. 
261 Engel, “Practical Guide,” 2, 3. 
262 Naim, Illicit, 204; Engel, “Practical Guide,” 2. 
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 NGOs are able to allocate their funding towards their specific goals and are able to shift 
funds quickly based on emerging priorities.  Private organizations are also more efficient 
than public entities.  They operate in a competitive environment and if they do not 
produce results, donors are likely to withdraw funding and the company will simply go 
out of business.  Conversely, governments have to fund a whole range of competing 
priorities and programs that will likely continue to receive funding even if they are 
inefficiently run and not achieving results.  Moreover, NGOs also surpass governments in 
their ability to expose corruption.  They are not subject to the same complex conflicts of 
interest that hinder governments.  Additionally, while governments must maintain a 
broad focus on a whole host of issues, NGOs are able to use precision focus on specific 
issues.  Lastly, NGOs are able to think outside of the box and take aggressive actions that 
governments are simply unwilling to take.263 
Armed with all of these comparative advantages, NGOs present one of the best 
ways for a nation to significantly reduce its incidence of corruption.  Countries within 
Southeast Europe should encourage the operations of these groups and provide whatever 
assistance is necessary to ensure that NGOs can function freely without political 
impediments or security concerns.  Governments that want to be successful will foster an 
environment where NGOs can properly do their jobs and accurately pinpoint corruption.  
On the other hand, countries like BiH that have threatened monitoring groups in the past 
have only complicated their problems.  Going forward, BiH—and all other countries 
within the region—need to work closely with NGOs operating within their borders and 
be willing to take action on any findings these groups report—even if they implicate 
members of the country’s political elite.264  
2. Media Scrutiny Can Increase Transparency 
It is also imperative that each country in the Balkans maintains a healthy and 
vigorous media that actively seeks out corruption and is not fearful to report the narrative, 
regardless of who is implicated.  The press holds a tremendous amount of power because 
263 Naim, Illicit, 203, 204; Chêne, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in BiH, 10. 
264 Engel, “Practical Guide,” 3.; Chêne, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in BiH, 10. 
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 they control the message that informs the majority of society.  Reporters help set the tone 
of the nation and are important in shaping public opinion.  It is therefore “essential for the 
media to help develop a climate in which organized crime and corruption is not 
tolerated.”265  Consequently, journalists need to take the lead in the war on corruption.  
They should ensure that crooked politicians are given no shelter and are portrayed 
negatively. 
It is vital for Southeast European governments to ensure that journalists within 
their borders are free to operate without fear of reprisal from criminals or powerful 
politicians.  A good first step would be for each country to pass laws “with categories of 
crimes directly relating to intimidation of those in such organizations—if they are 
intimidated then the state and society lose out overall.”266  These laws should contain 
harsh sentences for offenders and be strictly enforced by authorities; it is imperative that 
law enforcement make the security of the media one of its top priorities.   
3. Using Social Entrepreneurship to Fight Corruption Would Increase 
Transparency  
In his book How to Change the World: Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of 
New Ideas, David Bornstein defines social entrepreneurs as individuals and private 
citizens who are “advancing systemic solutions to [help address] major social 
problems.”267  Bornstein argues that these highly driven individuals are “uniquely suited 
to make headway on problems that have resisted considerable money and intelligence”268 
in the past.  He continues by saying, “Where governments and traditional organizations 
look at problems from the outside, social entrepreneurs come to understand them 
intimately, from within…Because they do not have armies or police forces behind them, 
265 Friends of Europe, Counter-Measures in the Balkans, 5. 
266 Engel, “Practical Guide,” 3. 
267 David Bornstein, How to Change the World: Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of New Ideas 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), ix. 
268 Ibid., xii. 
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 they work to elicit change rather than impose it, so they build human capacity rather than 
encouraging dependency.”269 
Corruption in Southeast Europe is a problem that has endured in the past despite 
significant government efforts to reduce it.  Social entrepreneurship could be one answer 
to help make progress in the region.  Similar approaches have been used to successfully 
attack the rampant corruption problems in Russia.  Alexei Navalny is a Russian lawyer, 
political activist, and blogger who used crowdsourcing to help uncover corrupt contracts 
issued by the Russian Federal government.  Navalny created a website called RosPil that 
listed suspicious government-issued contracts that can be reviewed and examined by the 
general public.  RosPil was very successful and drew increased public attention to several 
dubious contracts worth millions of dollars.  Navalny’s efforts even led to the resignation 
of Vladimir Pekhtin—the Head of the Russian Duma ethics committee—after Navalny 
released documents showing that Pekhtin owned over $2 million of real estate in Miami 
that had not been reported to the Parliament.  Navalny was so successful in pointing out 
corruption within the Russian government that he was arrested in July 2013.270 
If crowdsourcing could be a successful strategy to reduce corruption in Russia, 
maybe the same thing should be tried in the Balkans.  Social entrepreneurs could create 
websites similar to RosPil where citizens could crowd-source reports on public 
individuals suspected of involvement in corruption.  Similar to the situation in Russia, the 
website in the Balkans would act as a tool to help publicly shame individuals who are 
involved in corrupt activities and help prevent them from taking such actions in the 
future.  Over time, the fear of being listed will help prevent improper activities by 
changing the behavior of corrupt persons.  Moreover, as behaviors begin to change, the 
public and political mindset will transform.  This will have a synergistic effect that will 
269 Ibid. 
270 Nikolav Petrov, “The Navalny Effect: RosPil.net,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
December 8, 2010, http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/12/08/navalny-effect-rospil.net/ 21ux; Greg Brown, 
“Crowdsourcing to Fight Corruption: Aleksei Navalny and the RosPil Experiment,” Sunlight Foundation, 
August 6, 2013, http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/ 2013/08/06/crowdsourcing-to-fight-corruption-aleksei-
navalny-and-the-rospil-experiment/; Tom Parfitt, “Head of Duma's Ethics Committee Resigns Over $2m 
Florida Properties,” The Telegraph, February 20, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
europe/ russia/9884483/Head-of-Dumas-ethics-committee-resigns-over-2m-Florida-properties.html.  
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 build upon itself the more people get involved.  Additionally, as the public changes its 
outlook and view on corruption, more individuals will view corruption as ‘wrong’ and, 
therefore, be more likely to report instances of corruption.  Over time, corruption will 
become less likely in the Balkans. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Although corruption levels in Southeast Europe have been relatively high for over 
two decades, there are many measures that have the potential to reduce the prevalence of 
corruption within the region.  Instead of constantly fighting an uphill battle against 
market forces, Balkan governments should employ measures that decrease the likelihood 
their politicians will take part in unethical behavior.  Lawmakers should improve on a 
range of existing laws so that the rewards of corrupt behavior are decreased while the 
risks are increased.  Additionally, the entire population of the region needs to be 
persuaded that corruption is not a normal way of life; instead it is a negative action that 
has harmful consequences on all of society.  In addition to trying to re-educate the adult 
population, governments should concentrate instruction on the next generation of 
children and young adults.   Over the course of a few generations, the public mindset 
could change considerably. 
Time is also an important component in the growth of democratic traditions in the 
region.  Although every country in the Balkans has developed a democratic system, it is 
the maturation of democracy that will reduce corruption over time.  Similarly, 
international cooperation between countries within the region and with international 
organizations like the EU will help decrease the likelihood of corruption.  Moreover, 
governments within Southeast Europe should foster better relationships with NGO 
monitoring groups that are better equipped to wage the war on corruption.  Authorities 
must also ensure the safety of the media so that reporters feel reasonably safe to report on 
crooked politicians.  Lastly, states should also encourage the participation of social 
entrepreneurs, even though these radical thinkers sometimes employ unorthodox methods 
in their attempt to solve problems that have resisted traditional government efforts. 
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 VI. CONCLUSION 
Although it is blatantly obvious, it warrants repeating that corruption—by its very 
definition—absolutely requires the active and willing participation of government 
officials.  In the Balkans, corruption continues to be such a persistent problem because 
some civic officials, at every level of government, abuse the confidence the public has 
entrusted to them in an attempt to benefit financially.  To be fair, this situation is not 
unique to Southeast Europe, as corruption affects every country in the world; however, 
the involvement of many members of the political elite--often at the very highest levels of 
government—and the close ties these individuals maintain with dangerous criminal 
elements are what distinguish the region’s problem.271 
The strong connections between criminal elements and the region’s political elites 
were forged during the decade of civil wars that plagued Southeast Europe in the 1990s.  
During this period, embargoes levied by the UN that banned the legal export of fuel, 
arms, and other goods that the various factions within Yugoslavia needed in order to 
continue fighting, created an opportunity for resourceful criminal groups to ingratiate 
themselves to the various governments within the region.  For the countries that emerged 
from the former Yugoslavia, the criminals provided the necessary fuel and weapons 
needed to prolong the bitter conflict.  In return, these criminal groups earned immense 
profits that served as a valuable influx of capital to the other countries of Southeast 
Europe during this period of chaos and economic uncertainty.  The money earned from 
the illegal trafficking of goods and weapons regularly found its way into the coffers of 
political parties and helped finance the elections of many public figures throughout the 
region.  In return, public officials regularly overlooked the other illegal activities 
conducted by these criminal groups because they were grateful for the vast wealth they 
generated.  This collaboration between criminal elements and the political elites has 
carried on until the modern day and continues to create problems for the region.272        
271 CSD, Corruption, Contraband, and Organized Crime, 9; Divjak and Pugh, “Political Economy,” 
373. 
272 UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 49 
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 One of the major problems caused by political corruption is that it helps 
discourage much needed foreign and domestic investment in the region.  Foreign 
companies with home offices in less-corrupt countries are rightfully uneasy about doing 
business in a region where individuals that are supposed to provide oversight and help 
prevent corruption are regularly active participants.  Many foreign companies also refuse 
to participate in accepted local customs—like offering gifts and favors to state officials—
to ensure successful endeavors.  Therefore, the culture of corruption frustrates the full 
economic development of markets within the region and has left Southeast Europe 
lagging behind the rest of the continent.273 
Southeast Europe not only lingers behind the West economically, but also trails 
the rest of Europe in nearly every governance indicator as measured by the World Bank.  
The countries of the Balkans are definitively the most corrupt region of Europe, with all 
six nations examined in this thesis ranked below the European/Central Asian average for 
2011.  Moreover, two countries—Kosovo and Albania—were ranked on a par with the 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asian—the two most corrupt regions on the planet—
averages.  The corruption problem is also all encompassing, with the UNODC reporting 
in 2006 that an overwhelming 25.9 percent of Southeast Europeans were subjected to 
corruption in the previous year, as compared to “only” 16.7 percent of Sub-Saharan 
Africans.274 
This high level of corruption in the Balkans is problematic since both the EU and 
NATO have continued to expand eastward since the breakup of the Soviet Union in the 
early 1990s.  It is important that any new members admitted to either organization share 
the same liberal democratic values that helped shape the original organizations and that 
are held dear by the current members.  Compared to other countries on the continent that 
have much older and more mature democratic traditions, the countries of Southeast 
Europe are relatively new democracies.  Although the IC can—and should—help the 
various countries of the region continue to develop their governments, the EU and NATO 
273 Divjak and Pugh, “Political Economy,” 377; Mazower, Balkans, 120. 
274 World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators:  http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_ 
countries.asp; UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, 91, 109.    
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 should not sacrifice their integrity by admitting countries with governments that have not 
first attained a high ethical standard that fully respects the rule of law.275   
Currently, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and Albania are already 
members of NATO.  Albania has consistently been ranked as one of the most corrupt 
countries within the Balkans.  Its extensive problems were covered at length in earlier 
sections and will not be repeated here.  In addition, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Croatia are also currently members of the EU.    Since its admission in 2007, Bulgaria has 
consistently been ranked as the most corrupt country within the EU.  Many fear that 
adequate provisions were not taken to ensure that Bulgaria, and for that matter Romania, 
had taken the proper steps towards eradicating corruption prior to being welcomed into 
the EU.  Although the EU has continued to provide oversight and has taken several 
measures—such as withholding funding and loans—in an attempt to further pressure the 
governments towards reform, much work in both countries still needs to be done.276   
On the other hand, Croatia, which was admitted to the EU in July 2013, will not 
be subject to EU monitoring or oversight now that it has already been awarded 
membership.  Unlike Bulgaria and Romania, the EU ensured that Zagreb achieved certain 
milestones on a pre-determined timeline ahead of Croatia’s admission.  However, there 
are many who are worried that many of the implementations were made haphazardly and 
at the last minute.  They fear that Croatia was admitted to the EU too soon and that all 
compulsory measures that could force Zagreb to further reduce its corruption have now 
been removed.  Only time will tell whether or not enough reforms were made prior to 
Croatia’s integration into the European community.  But with every other country within 
the region working towards future accession into the EU, it is important for the IC to take 
advantage of the leverage that possible membership into the prestigious organization 
provides.  The potential benefits of admission into the European community are 
significant and the EU should take advantage of every opportunity to help encourage 
reforms in each and every country within the Balkans.277 
275 Sioussiouras and Vavouras, “Political Rights, Development, and Corruption,” 101. 
276 “EU Keeps Watch on Bulgaria and Romania,” Jane’s. 
277 Ali, “EU Entry May Not Change Corruption in Croatia.” 
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